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Summary Table 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -5.4 1.0 -2.4 -2.3 -2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure -4.4 -6.5 -4.3 -2.2 -2.2 
Investment -27.6 -22.6 -12.6 -5.4 4.1 
Exports -3.8 6.2 5.1 5.6 6.2 
Imports -9.7 3.6 -0.3 2.2 5.5 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -5.5 -0.8 1.4 1.8 2.1 
Gross National Product (GNP) -8.1 0.9 -2.5 -0.2 0.7 
        
     Prices (Annual Growth %) 
     Consumer Price Index (CPI) -4.5 -1.0 2.6 1.9 1.8 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 -1.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 
        
     Labour Market 
     Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,929 1,848 1,810 1,796 1,793 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 259 292 304 313 307 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.8 13.6 14.4 14.8 14.6 
        
     Public Finance 
     Exchequer Balance (€bn) -24.6 -18.7 -24.9 -18.1 -14.1 
General Government Balance (€bn) -22.5 -48.4 -20.2 -13.1 -12.4 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -13.9 -30.9 -12.7 -8.1 -7.5 
General Government Balance excluding bank costs  
(% of GDP) -11.5 -10.8 -9.0 -8.1 -7.5 
General Government Debt, % of GDP 65 92 106 115 119 
        
     External Trade 
     Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -3.8 1.8 1.8 2.3 3.3 
Current Account (% of GNP) -2.8 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.6 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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Summary 
 
Notwithstanding the considerable obstacles to growth facing Ireland’s main 
trading partners, results for 2011 show that output grew for the first time in four 
years, expanding by 1.4 per cent in GDP terms. However, domestic demand 
remained very weak and GNP, which we consider to be a better measure of 
Ireland’s economic performance, fell again, contracting by 2.5 per cent. We 
expect that GNP will fall marginally again this year, before increasing modestly in 
2013. Unemployment will remain high at 14.8 per cent, declining only slightly next 
year and the balance of payments surplus is expected to continue to rise. The 
fiscal targets are likely to be comfortably met this year and next year, with the 
appropriate changes in taxes and expenditure, the targets should be met. 
 
In the past two to three years uncertainty about the international environment 
has limited Ireland’s recovery. Looking forward, the recent measures introduced 
by the European Central Bank have proved more convincing to date than previous 
attempts and look set to provide the necessary foundations upon which wider 
demand conditions can gradually improve. Most observers expect a modest 
revival of growth in the UK and eurozone next year and, provided uncertainties 
relating to the US federal debt ceiling are resolved, the Irish economy should 
benefit from a relatively more benign external environment in 2013.  
 
Services exports are likely to be the main driver of export growth this year, 
although goods exports, particularly those of indigenous industries, are likely to 
contract modestly. On the domestic front, fiscal retrenchment is almost certain to 
constrain domestic demand over the forecast horizon, yet renewed investment 
expenditure looks set to partly offset this impact next year, with strong FDI 
inflows, development projects undertaken by NAMA and the Government’s 
investment stimulus providing some impetus for growth.  
 
In the General Assessment we express some reservations about the potential 
impact of the investment stimulus on the Irish economy, in spite of its 
contribution to near-term growth. In addition, despite the improvement in the 
Irish public finances so far, the scale of the adjustment still required is still very 
substantial. Looking at the main areas of expenditure, current transfers and 
current expenditure on goods and services account for 42 per cent and 40 per 
cent of total underlying expenditure, respectively, so that it is difficult to see how 
cuts in these areas can be avoided. 
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National Accounts 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.1 81.3 -0.9 1.5 -2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.2 25.4 -2.9 1.5 -4.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.7 16.1 -14.0 -1.7 -12.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 157.8 166.8 5.7 0.6 5.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.6 0.2 
   Final Demand 284.2 289.8 2.0 0.8 1.2 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 128.3 131.9 2.8 3.1 -0.3 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.6 1.0 
   GDP at Market Prices 156.5 159.0 1.6 0.2 1.4 
Net Factor Payments (F) -26.3 -32.0 
   GNP at Market Prices 130.2 127.0 -2.4 0.0 -2.5 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 2.6 3.2 0.7 27.1 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.7 67.8 -0.9 -1.4 
Other 54.4 58.1 3.6 6.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.5 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -0.6 -1.0 
  Net Domestic Product 124.6 127.4 2.9 2.3 
Net Factor Payments -26.3 -32.0 -5.7 21.7 
National Income 98.3 95.5 -2.8 -2.9 
Depreciation 16.0 15.8 -0.2 -1.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 114.3 111.3 -3.0 -2.6 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.9 15.8 -0.2 -1.2 
GNP at Market Prices 130.2 127.0 -3.2 -2.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 29.5 34.9 5.4 
F -26.3 -32.0 -5.7 
Net Transfers -1.4 -1.2 0.3 
Balance on Current Account 1.8 1.8 0.0 
as % of GNP 1.4 1.4 0.0 
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National Accounts 2012 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.3 80.9 -0.5 1.8 -2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.4 25.8 1.4 3.6 -2.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 16.1 15.2 -5.5 0.0 -5.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 177.9 6.7 1.0 5.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.2 -0.1    
Final Demand 289.8 299.7 3.4 1.4 2.0 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 131.9 138.9 5.3 3.0 2.2 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 1.0    
GDP at Market Prices 159.0 161.8 1.8 0.0 1.8 
Net Factor Payments (F) -32.0 -35.5    
GNP at Market Prices 127.0 126.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.0 -0.3 -8.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 67.8 67.7 -0.1 -0.1 
Other 58.1 61.0 2.9 5.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.6 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.0 -1.0 
  Net Domestic Product 127.4 130.0 2.6 2.0 
Net Factor Payments -32.0 -35.5 -3.5 11.1 
National Income 95.5 94.5 -0.9 -1.0 
Depreciation 15.8 15.5 -0.3 -2.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 111.3 110.0 -1.3 -1.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 16.3 0.6 3.6 
GNP at Market Prices 127.0 126.3 -0.7 -0.5 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 34.9 38.9 4.0 
F -32.0 -35.5 -3.5 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 1.8 2.3 0.5 
as % of GNP 1.4 1.8 0.4 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 80.9 80.6 -0.4 1.6 -2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.8 24.3 -5.6 -3.5 -2.2 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 15.2 15.9 4.2 0.1 4.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 177.9 193.3 8.6 2.3 6.2 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 1.0 
   Final Demand 299.7 315.0 5.1 1.4 3.6 
less: 
     Imports of Goods and Services (M) 138.9 149.8 7.9 2.3 5.5 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.0 1.0 
   GDP at Market Prices 161.8 166.2 2.7 0.6 2.1 
Net Factor Payments (F) -35.5 -38.9 
   GNP at Market Prices 126.3 127.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.2 0.2 7.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 67.7 67.5 -0.2 -0.3 
Other 61.0 64.1 3.1 5.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.6 -0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.0 -1.0 
  Net Domestic Product 130.0 133.2 3.2 2.4 
Net Factor Payments -35.5 -38.9 -3.4 9.6 
National Income 94.5 94.3 -0.2 -0.2 
Depreciation 15.5 15.5 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 110.0 109.8 -0.2 -0.2 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 17.5 1.2 7.1 
GNP at Market Prices 126.3 127.3 0.9 0.7 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2012 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 38.9 43.2 4.4 
F -35.5 -38.9 -3.4 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 2.3 3.3 1.0 
as % of GNP 1.8 2.6 0.8 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
The International Economy 
The immediate outlook for the world economy remains poor amid persistent 
tensions in the eurozone and a weakening performance in emerging markets, 
with all major economic regions now facing varying degrees of slowdown in 
economic activity. Any prospect of a global recovery is, therefore, likely to remain 
somewhat distant until a satisfactory resolution of these tensions is evident. 
 
Large emerging economies such as Brazil, India and China have been relatively 
insulated from the financial crisis to date, with rapid convergence and sound 
fiscal and monetary policies the key to underpinning their continued growth. 
Downside risks have risen slightly in many of these economies since the last 
Commentary, however. Potential spillover effects (in the form of lower external 
demand) and tighter financing conditions (resulting from on-going turmoil in the 
eurozone) pose the most prominent risk to growth in the near term. In addition, 
reduced manoeuvrability in terms of fiscal policy in many of these economies is 
proving to be a greater source of concern now as activity elsewhere wanes. 
 
Turning to the US, fears of a large-scale discontinuation of Government support 
measures in 2013, originally introduced to allay the impact of recent economic 
declines, have resulted in more subdued domestic demand and are contributing 
to a deceleration in economic activity. Widespread declines in items of consumer 
spending and a weakening in both residential and non-residential fixed 
investment were visible over the second quarter. This slowdown is also becoming 
more marked as the possibility rises that political deadlock could result in a 
failure to raise the federal debt ceiling. Such an outcome would involve a fiscal 
retrenchment that could severely inhibit a nascent recovery in the US economy 
and it seems that the situation is unlikely to be resolved in full before the US 
presidential election in November. With this in mind, the recent decision by the 
Federal Reserve to extend its quantitative easing operations in order to target 
weak employment growth is welcome, given that it should reduce long-term 
interest rates and boost aggregate demand. It is unclear at this stage, however, 
just how effective additional rounds of monetary easing will be and whether or 
not this approach will be sufficient to counteract existing obstacles to growth. 
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The UK authorities are facing difficulties in meeting commitments to consolidate 
public finances over the next five years, while simultaneously attempting to avoid 
stagnation in economic growth. Signs of recovery thus far have been muted, with 
output growth effectively flat during the past two years. Below-average growth is 
anticipated to continue over the forecast horizon, with considerable risks to the 
downside. Eurozone strains again pose a serious problem to the pace of recovery 
in the UK given that member states represent the UK’s main trade partner, 
accounting for a half of all goods exported from the UK on average over the 
period 2006 to 2011 and just over a third of annual services exports on average 
between 2007 and 2010. Unfavourable external developments have 
accompanied weak prospects on the domestic side where a legacy of significant 
private and public sector indebtedness exists. Deleveraging in both sectors has 
weighed heavily on output growth and is likely to do so further over the near 
term. In addition, tighter credit conditions and heightened uncertainty with 
respect to employment and earnings prospects have weakened household 
spending, while capital investment by businesses is not expected to recover until 
signs of a wider recovery in demand become evident. As such, planned 
consolidation measures may ease over the forecast horizon so as to avoid stifling 
further an already subdued growth path. It is also hoped that non-standard Bank 
of England measures, such as the ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’, which may well 
expand in future, might spur some modest pick-up in domestic demand.1 
 
The eurozone has been at the core of recent concerns regarding a weakening in 
global economic activity. Growth across member states has lost significant 
momentum since mid-2011, with each of the main countries showing very 
modest or slightly negative output growth quarter-on-quarter. The largest of 
these, Germany, which had looked like it could represent an engine of growth 
driving any recovery in the eurozone, has also seen growth mired at relatively low 
rates in recent quarters. German investment, particularly in industry, has 
declined as the outlook for export demand diminishes and consumer spending, 
although relatively buoyant in the second quarter, is likely to suffer in turn. This is 
corroborated by the latest available indicators for Germany and the eurozone, 
which suggest that an originally anticipated improvement in the second half of 
the year may well be postponed. Qualitative business and consumer indicators 
for the eurozone as a whole point to a further deterioration in July and August. 
This follows a further intensification of on-going banking sector and sovereign 
debt concerns in the eurozone, particularly in relation to the Spanish economy. 
Despite some tentative signs of moderation in the pace of contraction in France, 
Italy and Spain, an apparent entrenchment in German weakness at the beginning 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  The Bank of England’s £80 billion ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ launched in July 2012 is intended to incentivise more 
household and business lending in the UK by providing direct central bank loans to banks or building societies below 
market interest rates. If these institutions subsequently decrease such lending, then the associated cost of obtaining 
this funding from the Bank of England is subject to an increase. 
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of the third quarter is expected to constrain near-term growth. At the earliest, 
conditions may pick up in 2013, although this assumption is heavily predicated on 
the adequacy of measures taken to resolve tensions across the monetary union 
over the remainder of this year. The recent announcement to undertake Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary markets for sovereign bonds in the 
eurozone by the ECB is a step in the right direction. But the system as a whole still 
requires confidence that banking systems are sufficiently capitalised before the 
wholesale money markets can return to their proper functioning.2 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year)
 
 Eurozone     United States      United Kingdom 
   
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
Figure 1 assembles data for official GDP growth rates in recent years for the US, 
UK and eurozone along with the range of latest forecasts from various 
international forecasting bodies for 2012 and 2013. A modest contraction in the 
eurozone now seems inevitable for this year, with very weak growth likely in 
2013. At best, US activity will continue to recover at a very slow pace. Risks are 
tilted to the downside, however, due to the damaging impact of political 
wrangling over federal debt levels, while the UK economy is not expected to 
recover dramatically next year as public and private balance sheets continue their 
reparations. Our exchange rate assumptions for 2012 anticipate a weak euro 
exchange rate for 2012 and 2013 vis-à-vis the US dollar and sterling relative to 
previous years (see Figure 2). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 Outright Monetary Transactions entail the purchase by the European Central Bank (ECB) of sovereign bonds on the 
primary or secondary markets and are focused on securities with a maturity of one to three years. This funding is to 
be provided so long as strict conditions attached to a macroeconomic adjustment programme or a precautionary 
programme are met. 
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FIGURE 2 Exchange Rates
 
 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Ireland and ESRI assumptions. 
 
While media commentary has correctly highlighted the risks of renewed 
recession in some major economies on the basis of defining a recession as two 
consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth, this definition of a recession does 
not deserve the emphasis given to it. Figure 3 shows the evolution in the levels of 
real GDP over the past eight years for the eurozone, US and UK. While underlying 
quarterly growth rates would appear to indicate mixed performances in recent 
years, levels of economic output outside of the US have, in fact, remained weak 
and have not been sufficient to return real activity to levels that prevailed before 
the downturn. Quarterly growth rates, on average, have not been greater than 
0.3 per cent in either of these economies. Pre-crisis peaks have not yet been 
surpassed, except in the US economy. This is reflected in the level of output, so 
that the concept that a sustained recovery has taken hold since troughs were 
reached in early 2009 is also less obvious.  
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FIGURE 3 Real GDP Indices for Selected Economies (Base: 2005 = 100)
 
 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which act as the official 
arbiter of the business cycle in the US, typically deliberate extensively over the 
classifications of periods of expansion and recession in the US economy. In its  
assessments, it considers a range of indicators aside from GDP data alone. One 
such indicator is employment data. Looking at aggregate employment levels in 
the eurozone, where wide internal divergences exist, it is not entirely apparent 
whether a recession has been exited and is threatening to return more recently 
or whether developments reflect an on-going recession, having failed to exhibit 
any sustained recovery since declines began in late 2008 (see Figure 4). The UK 
economy, on the other hand, appears to have had recovered some ground in 
2010 after a relatively worse contraction in employment, although this was not 
sustained beyond the third quarter of that year. On the basis of these measures, 
it can be seen that current activity has not returned to levels visible prior to the 
downturn and neither the eurozone nor the UK have clearly exited what might 
well be conceived of as a prolonged recession. 
 
90 
92 
94 
96 
98 
100 
102 
104 
106 
108 
110 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
euro area UK US 
6  |  Qu ar te r l y  Eco no mic  Co mme nt ary  –  A u tu mn  20 12  
 
FIGURE 4 Seasonally Adjusted Employment Levels for Selected Economies (Persons, Thousands)
 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat. 
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2 
 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
Annual results from National Income and Expenditure Accounts show that the 
volume of exports of goods and services grew by 5.1 per cent in 2011 and by 5.7 
per cent in value terms, indicating that the overall export price deflator showed 
moderate growth at just 0.6 per cent. Trade data indicate that the main driver of 
growth last year were services exports, which grew by 7.7 per cent in volume 
compared with 2.7 per cent in the volume of merchandise trade.  
 
The value of goods exported in the first half of 2012 was marginally less than the 
value of goods exported in the first half of 2011.  The interpretation of the data 
for this period is complicated by some pharmaceutical products coming off- 
patent, where significant price falls might be expected.  For other exports, prices 
might have increased as the euro had depreciated against the dollar.  Looking at 
some categories of exports the value of food and beverages exports was down 2.7 
per cent, medicinal and pharmaceutical products were down by 9.3 per cent, 
while other chemical products exports were virtually unchanged. Exports of 
professional equipment rose by 6 per cent, while electrical machinery exports fell 
by 6.3 per cent. The general weakness in exports following the dip in demand in 
the UK and the Eurozone economies from the second half of last year has 
continued into 2012.  As discussed in the accompanying research note “Trends in 
Irish Exports”, the dependence on currently weak economies is a serious 
constraint on any recovery in Irish exports.  This matters in particular for 
indigenous firms in the food and drink sectors, from where the bulk of output 
from the traditional sector comes.  The counterpart to weak export sales is weak 
production.  Traditional sector output in 2011 was virtually unchanged from its 
level in 2010, but declined from its third quarter peak by 1.9 per cent in the fourth 
quarter and a further 3.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2012, before recovering 
slightly in the second quarter.  The level in that quarter was 3.5 per cent below 
the average level for 2011 as a whole. By contrast, modern sector output has 
continued to grow, output of chemicals and pharmaceuticals rose on the first half 
of the previous year, though turnover was down significantly, reflecting the fall in 
the price of off-patent drugs, among other factors.3  The patent issue is one that 
has affected the value of production, the value of exports, and the amount of 
profits of firms affected.  There may also be some volume effects on production 
and exports depending on how a product out of patent is treated. It could be 
argued that with the expiry of patent protection there is a loss of intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  The “modern” sector comprises of a number of high-technology and chemical sectors. 
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property and the products affected are now new products, although the active 
ingredient is unchanged.  It remains to be seen what procedure is adopted.  
Typically, when changes occur then a convention is adopted for treating the 
change and there may be some discontinuities in the data and difficulties in 
interpretation. 
 
Taking the year as a whole we expect traditional sector exports to fall by about 
3.5 per cent and exports of the modern sector to increase by 4.5 per cent, both in 
volume terms, with price increases of 2 and 3 per cent, respectively. Overall, 
merchandise export volumes may rise by about 2.5-3 per cent this year.  For 2013, 
as discussed earlier, we expect no major increase in output and demand in the 
eurozone or in the UK economies.  Thus, traditional sector exports are unlikely to 
grow rapidly, though there could be some growth in exports to the UK as firms 
competitiveness has improved.  Modern sector exports are likely to continue to 
grow rapidly.  Significant output is coming on stream from early 2013 from the 
expansion of existing firms in the pharmaceutical and electronics sectors, so that 
overall merchandise exports might grow by about 6 per cent. 
 
Tourism receipts this year have also been affected by the slowdown in the world 
economy. The number of tourists from the UK and the US in the first half of the 
year are down on the first half of 2011. However, the number of those from 
Europe and the rest of the world have increased. Overall the number may be 
slightly up on last year, but much less than previously forecast, primarily because 
of the downturn in the UK and the eurozone economies.  There may be modest 
growth again in 2013, but a further deterioration in the EU economies could easily 
make this look wildly optimistic. 
 
Exports of other services are dominated by a small number of multinationals in 
the high-tech area. Sales from these companies reflect a still strong demand 
situation, particularly in communications, software and back-office support 
services. Thus, we expect continued rapid growth in these services this year and 
next, by about 8.5 per cent and 6.5 per cent respectively. 
 
TABLE 1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % 
Merchandise 84.9 2.7 3.0 6.0 
Tourism 3.3 4.0 2.8 3.5 
Other Services 78.2 7.9 8.5 6.5 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 5.1 5.6 6.2 
 
Note:   Value of total exports of goods and services includes FISM adjustment. 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Investment 
 
Gross fixed capital formation continued to contract in 2011, although at a slower 
pace than had been experienced in 2009 and 2010. The estimated volume fall of 
12.6 per cent was the fourth successive year of contraction and is higher than 
previously estimated. With the investment deflator continuing to contract the 
value of investment fell by 14 per cent.  
 
In light of the weaker growth in 2011 and the available indicators for 2012, we 
have revised downwards our forecast for this year. Investment in both residential 
and other building appears to be still contracting, although our view is now that 
prospects for residential investment are weaker than we had previously thought, 
while the contraction in other building will be more moderate. Construction costs 
seem to have stabilised so that overall new housing and other construction prices 
are likely to remain relatively unchanged. Prices for existing houses look set to fall 
by approximately 15 per cent this year and perhaps by up to 10 per cent. Overall, 
building and construction is forecast to decline by close to 13 per cent in 2012, 
marginally less than in 2011. Investment in machinery and equipment is forecast 
to increase by 3.4 per cent in volume, a substantial improvement on the 
contraction of over 8 per cent recorded in 2011. Thus, total gross fixed capital 
formation in 2012 is forecast to decline by 5.4 per cent in 2012. 
 
The biggest change to our forecast since the previous Commentary is to our 
forecast for investment in 2013. In addition to the announcement by NAMA that 
it would undertake some investment in residential and commercial construction, 
the government has announced an infrastructure stimulus package involving 
projects for the Departments of Health, Justice, Education and Transport. The 
lead in time on the announced projects suggests that the impact on 2012 will be 
small and that most of the impact will be in 2014, though there will be some 
effect in 2013 if the projects go ahead promptly. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
appears to be holding up well, with new firms locating in Ireland in services and 
the expansion of existing firms in both services and manufacturing. Potentially, 
there are still some projects that could be located here – notably a further 
expansion of Intel. On the basis of these factors, total investment is expected to 
rise in 2013, by 4.1 per cent in volume terms. 
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TABLE 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % Change in Volume 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % 
Housing 3.9 -11.9 -18.9 0.0 
Other Building 4.9 -18.7 -7.5 8.0 
Total Building and Construction 8.8 -15.8 -12.6 4.7 
Machinery and Equipment 7.3 -8.3 3.4 3.5 
Total 16.1 -12.6 -5.4 4.1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Incomes, Prices and Consumption 
 
Incomes 
Data in the National Income and Expenditure for 2011 show that income in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing rose to €3.2 billion, reflecting strong output and 
price growth. With output this year affected by poor weather it is likely that 
incomes in this broad sector will be weaker in 2012, although they should show 
some recovery in 2013 if more normal weather conditions prevail. 
 
Aggregate non-agricultural wages, salaries and pensions, including employers’ 
social welfare contributions fell by 1.4 per cent in 2011. It would appear that this 
is mainly due to the fall in employment during the year as data on average 
earnings suggest that these remained broadly unchanged in 2011. With 
employment expected to continue to decline this year and wage growth 
remaining weak, a further decline in non-agricultural wages etc. is forecast for 
this year, although at just 0.1 per cent this represents a return to some stability 
following three successive years of sharper declines. The decline in employment 
is forecast to continue into 2013, although this will be smaller than in recent 
years. Allowing for our assumption that average earnings will be unchanged, we 
expect non-agricultural wages and salaries to show a marginal decline next year. 
Other non-agricultural incomes, (interest, dividends, rent and self-employed 
earnings) also declined in 2011 resulting in total income falling by 1.4 per cent. 
Total income is expected to decline this year and remain broadly unchanged in 
2013. Transfer payments are expected to decline this year and again in 2013, 
while personal taxation is expected to continue to grow as further revenue raising 
measures are introduced. Thus, aggregate personal disposable income, which is 
estimated at €85.9 billion last year, will decline to €84.1 billion in 2012 and €82.9 
billion in 2013. 
 
According to data from the latest National Income and Expenditure, the personal 
savings rate fell sharply in 2010 to 6.8 per cent from 11.4 per cent in 2009. The 
sharp decline continued into 2011 with the savings rate being recorded at 5.4 per 
cent. This savings rate contrasts with the high level of savings depicted by the 
Institutional Sector Accounts.4 This decline is consistent with the view, expressed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  The difference arises due to the fact that the sector accounts provide a broader measure of savings by including non-
life insurance premiums and claims, and private sector social contributions and benefits as well as some other items. 
Savings in the Institutional Sector Accounts is a gross figure, whereas National Accounts show net savings. 
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in the last Commentary, that the fall in household incomes has reduced 
household resources and that much of personal savings relates to the repayment 
of debt rather than the accumulation of savings. Indeed, the evidence from the 
National Accounts suggests that it is possible that personal consumption levels 
are being maintained by reducing savings, see Table 3. With saving levels reduced 
as substantially as they have been they are unlikely to support consumption going 
forward. With decline forecast in disposable income our view is that personal 
savings will continue to decline and so we expect that the saving rate will fall to 
2.8 per cent in 2013.  
 
TABLE 3 Personal Disposable Income 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 € bn € bn € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.7 67.8 67.7 67.5 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 12.5 11.5 11.0 11.0 
   
   Total Income Received 83.7 82.5 81.7 81.7 
Current Transfers 25.2 25.8 25.4 24.7 
   
   Gross Personal Income 109.0 108.4 107.1 106.5 
Direct Personal Taxes 20.9 22.4 23.0 23.6 
   
   Personal Disposable Income 88.1 85.9 84.1 82.9 
Consumption 82.1 81.3 80.9 80.6 
Personal Savings 6.0 4.6 3.2 2.3 
Savings Ratio 6.8 5.4 3.8 2.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 19.2 20.7 21.5 22.1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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FIGURE 5 Personal Savings Rate, Personal Savings as a % of Personal Disposable Income 
 
 
 
Source:  Based on CSO, National Income and Expenditure Accounts 2011. 
 
Consumer Prices 
The annual increase in consumer prices averaged 1.9 per cent in the seven 
months to end-July. Having peaked this year to date at an annual rate of 2.2 per 
cent in March, the index has declined steadily with annual inflation running at 1.6 
per cent in July. However, the weaker exchange rate and high energy prices 
means we expect inflation to increase over the second half of this year, although 
this could be moderated if the euro/dollar rate improves on the back of the new 
ECB measures. On this basis we are forecasting an annual average rate of 
inflation of 1.9 per cent this year. With energy prices expected to remain high and 
some pick-up in activity, we anticipate that inflation will remain at around this 
level in 2013. 
 
Personal Consumption 
According to the National Accounts, the volume of personal consumption in 2011 
fell by 2.4 per cent. The personal consumption deflator grew by 1.5 per cent 
compared with a fall in 2009 and 2010. Thus, the fall in the value of personal 
consumption was just 0.9 per cent.  
 
Figures for the first half of 2012 indicate that the volume of retail sales has 
continued to decline, and that the retail sales deflator has remained positive but 
moderate. Data from the retail sales index shows a mixed picture for the 
performance of different retail sectors. The motor trade (cars and fuel) has 
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shown a sharp decline in sales, partly reflecting the end of the car scrappage 
scheme. The sale of books, newspapers, stationary and other goods has also 
declined. Although other sectors have declined there are some signs of stability. 
However, there is need for caution. The category entitled household equipment 
has been relatively stable in the past number of years. The more disaggregated 
data show that, within this group, sales of furniture and lighting, and hardware, 
paints and glass have continued to decline, while in recent months there has 
been strong growth in retail sales of electrical goods.  
 
FIGURE 6 Retail Sales, Volume Index, Base year 2005=100 
 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In recent months the KBC Bank Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index has risen. 
While not perfectly aligned, this would suggest, historically, some growth in the 
value of consumption. However, in the present situation household finances are 
constrained and disposable incomes are likely to contract further following 
December’s Budget. Thus, over the remainder of the year it seems likely that 
overall retail sales will remain weak. With concerns about personal income levels 
associated with the introduction of the property tax and the next Budget, we 
continue to expect that personal consumption volumes will contract in 2012 and 
2013, although the contraction in 2013 will be more moderate than that 
experienced in recent years. With the deflator on personal consumption 
averaging 1.6 per cent in 2013, the value of personal consumption is forecast to 
decline by 0.4 per cent in 2013. In volume terms personal consumption is 
expected to contract by 2.3 per cent this year and by 2.0 per cent in 2013.  
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FIGURE 7 Consumer Sentiment and Growth in Personal Consumption (Value) 
 
 
 
Source:  KBC Bank Ireland and Central Statistics Office.
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Public Finances 
 
The Exchequer returns for August indicate that in aggregate terms the public 
finances are broadly consistent with the outcome for the year set out in Budget 
2012. Table 4 compares the 2012 and 2011 revenue outcomes for the year to end 
August. The adjusted figures for 2012 allows for the carryover into 2012 of 
corporation tax from 2011 of €251 million and a reclassification of PRSI receipts to 
income tax this year amounting to €254 million to end August. The adjustments 
allow us to consider the underlying revenue position. For the first eight months 
overall revenue growth has been strong – particularly income tax including the 
Universal Social Charge (USC). Unfortunately, the data do not separate out the USC 
from the total, though this should be possible and should be published. VAT 
receipts have increased but as there was an increase in the standard rate from 21 
per cent to 23 per cent the increase in revenue is not surprising – in spite of the 
general weakness in household and investment spending. Corporation tax receipts 
have increased – though a significant proportion of the payments are due in the 
final quarter.  Receipts from excise duties have fallen, partly it seems as a result of 
timing issues related to the increase in motor registration tax, while the increase in 
the duty on tobacco products may have reduced purchases through retail outlets.  
 
TABLE 4 Tax Revenue, € million, January-August 2011 and 2012 
 
 
Jan.-
Aug  
Jan.-
Aug  
Jan-Aug 
adjusted 
% 
change 
2011-
adjusted 
2012 
 2011 2012 2012  
Income tax (incl. USC) 8,288 9,356 9,092 9.7 
VAT 6,620 6,827 6,827 3.1 
Corporation Tax 1,762 2,131 1,877 6.5 
Excise 2,983 2,938 2,938 -1.5 
 Other 849 824 824 -2.9 
  
    Total  20,502 22,076 21,558 5.2 
 
Source:  Analysis based on Dept. of Finance data. 
 
While the figures for the year to end-August are good, the figures for both July and 
August were running below those for the same period in 2011. There were special 
factors at work in July 2011 which increased the revenue figures and these were 
not present this year. In aggregate for the two months, the decline is 3.1 per cent.  
There is a high degree of variability in monthly and quarterly figures so that the 
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revenue position must be monitored. At present, the overall targets for the year 
seem realisable with total tax revenue coming in at €36 billion, or at about the 
same level as in the Stability Programme Update (SPU). The forecast General 
Government Balance (GGB) of 8.1 per cent is marginally better than the original 
Troika target of 8.6 per cent, partly reflecting the higher level of nominal GDP. 
Generally, the revenue figures have been close to the time profile expected on a 
cumulative basis, though monthly the data are more varied, as might be expected  
(Figure 8). 
 
FIGURE 8  Exchequer Tax Revenues (euro millions) 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Analysis based on Dept. of Finance data. 
 
The expenditure side for the year to end August is more difficult to interpret.  The 
budget projections (modified in the Revised Estimates for the Public Services 2012, 
February 2012 and adjusted later in April) envisaged a decline of 2.2 per cent in 
gross voted current expenditure and of 13.4 per cent in gross voted capital 
expenditure with overall expenditure falling by 3.3 per cent. The data to end August 
indicate an increase in net voted current expenditure of 2.4 per cent and a decline 
of 20.9 per cent in capital expenditure, with total expenditure increasing by 0.8 per 
cent.  The main difficulty with the interpretation of the data relates to the concept 
of “net” expenditure, particularly in relation to social protection. The figures for 
social protection are net of PRSI receipts so that a reduction in PRSI receipts 
appears as increased expenditure. Since PRSI receipts are running below 
expectations then welfare payments appear to be increasing. In the same way, the 
reclassification of some PRSI receipts to income tax can affect relative comparisons.  
A similar issue arises in the health vote as payments from the UK Department of 
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Health which “reduce” expenditure, were received in July, somewhat earlier than 
expected. In both of these departments expenditure was running ahead of that 
planned. The problem of interpretation could readily be resolved by treating PRSI 
receipts as tax revenue and other receipts, as with Health, as miscellaneous 
receipts on the revenue side.  In spite of these difficulties in the interpretation of 
the data it is apparent that expenditure will increase this year by a modest amount. 
 
It is necessary to place this analysis within our forecasting framework.  This year 
there has been a significant reduction in public sector employment following the 
early retirement package, normal retirement and restrictions on recruitment.  The 
lump sum payments add to expenditure this year, so that the value of net current 
expenditure on goods and services will increase but next year these payments will 
not be made and there will be some carryover on pay savings from this year. By 
year end public employment excluding state bodies could be 3 per cent down and 
this has implications for 2013.  With continued restrictions on non-pay expenditure 
in general government we expect the volume of net current expenditure to fall by 
about 2 per cent this year and again in 2013.  The deflator for public consumption 
will increase this year as a result of lump sum payments but will decline in 2013 as 
the total pay bill (including public sector pensions) falls. 
 
TABLE 5 Exchequer Finances 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Outcome 
€bn 
Outcome 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Forecast 
€bn 
Net current expenditure 47.0 48.0 51.1 50.9 
Net voted expenditure 40.5 41.4 42.5 41.5 
Non-voted expenditure 6.5 6.6 8.6 9.4 
  
    Current Revenue 34.4 36.8 38.7 39.0 
 Tax revenue 31.8 34.0 36.0 37.0 
Non-Tax revenue 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.0 
  
    Current Budget Balance -12.6 -11.2 -12.4 -11.9 
  
    Capital Resources 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 
Capital Expenditure 8.0 16.2 7.5 4.0 
Capital Expenditure - Voted 5.9 4.3 4.1 3.0 
Capital expenditure - non voted  2.0 11.9 3.4 1.0 
Capital Budget Balance -6.2 -13.7 -5.7 -2.3 
  
    Exchequer Balance -18.7 -24.9 -18.1 -14.1 
as % of GDP -12.0 -15.7 -11.2 -8.5 
  
    General Government Balance -48.4 -20.2 -13.1 -12.4 
as % of GDP -30.9 -12.7 -8.1 -7.5 
 
Note: The Exchequer Balance figure for 2012 is adjusted to take account of the arrangement made for the March promissory note 
payment of €3 billion. 
Source: Stability Programme Update and own forecasts. 
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The public finance position remains very difficult. After five years of adjustment 
the deficit remains high and while the targets set with the Troika are being met 
there is still a considerable amount to do before balance is restored.  The extent 
of the deterioration in the public finances is still little appreciated so that it is 
worthwhile to look at the numbers. 
 
TABLE 6  Receipts and Expenditure of Government, € million 
 
 2002 2007 Change 
2002-
2007 
2011 Change 
2007-
2011 
 € million € million € million € million € million 
Receipts      
Taxes on income and wealth 14,381 20,904 6,523 18,642 -2,262 
Social Insurance taxes 5,517 9,053 3,536 7,532 -1,521 
Taxes on expenditure 15,828 25,216 9,388 17,678 -7,538 
Rental, investment income etc. 1,557 2,238 681 2,620 382 
Miscellaneous receipts (1) 1,703 2,933 1,230 3,991 1,058 
Total Current Receipts (2) 38,986 60,345 21,359 50,464 -9,881 
Taxes on capital (3) 770 3,486 2,716 1,123 -2,363 
Loan Repayments and Equity Sales 1,197 861 -336 759 -102 
Other capital receipts (4) 1,488 2,531 1,043 303 -2,228 
Total Capital Receipts 3,455 6,880 3,425 2,185 -4,695 
Total Receipts 42,441 67,223 24,782 52,649 -14,574 
Expenditure      
Subsidies 788 870 82 639 -231 
National debt interest 1,758 1,957 199 5,143 3,186 
Transfer payments 13,429 23,180 9,751 28,319 5,139 
Expenditure on goods and services (5) 19,107 29,530 10,423 27,111 -2,419 
 Of which wages, salaries and pensions 11,973 19,838 7,865 18,854 -984 
Total current expenditure (6) 35,082 55,537 20,455 61,213 5,676 
Grants to enterprises (7) 617 823 206 6,060 5,237 
Gross physical capital formation (8) 5,342 8,788 3,446 4,249 -4,539 
Redemption of securities/loans etc. 13,003 8,223 -4,780 1,936 -6,287 
Other capital expenditure (9) 597 1,051 454 391 -624 
Total Capital Expenditure 19,559 18,885 -674 12,636 -6,249 
Total Expenditure 54,641 74,422 19,781 73,849 -573 
Net Lending/Borrowing (2+3+4-6-7-8-9) -394 166 560 -20,023 -20,189 
General Government Balance (GGB) -460 170 630 -20,158 -20,328 
Net Expenditure on goods and services excl. 
Depreciation (5-1) 
17,404 26596 9,192 23,119 -3,477 
Depreciation 1,597 2400 803 2,291 -109 
Net expenditure on goods and services 19,000 28997 9,997 25,410 -3,587 
 
Source:  National Income and Expenditure Accounts 2011.  
  *Figures in brackets refer to redemptions of securities and loan repayments. 
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The data in the table summarise the public finance position associated with the 
bubble economy and the recession over the period 2002 to 2011. In the period of 
the boom both revenue and expenditure expanded rapidly. Nominal current 
expenditure increased by almost 10 per cent per annum over the five years 2002 
to 2007 with transfer payments and pay increasing by about 11.5 per cent per 
annum. Total receipts increased more rapidly than total expenditure with the 
General Government Balance moving from a small deficit in 2002 to a small 
surplus in 2007. The data also show the extraordinary turnabout since 2007.  The 
net effect is captured by Net Lending/Borrowing which has moved from a small 
surplus in 2007 to a deficit of over €20 billion (of which €5.8 billion arises due to 
the costs to the state of recapitalisation of banks in 2011). Both revenue and 
expenditure have been affected. Total receipts fell by €14.6 billion (-21.7 per 
cent). The decline was widespread across all major categories of taxation – 
income taxes, social insurance taxes, VAT, and Capital Gains taxes. On the 
expenditure side national debt interest has increased significantly, reflecting the 
increased government borrowing associated with the recession, and the rapid 
growth in total transfer payments. Other current expenditure has been cut, and 
investment expenditure has fallen by over half.   
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Population and the Labour Market 
 
Despite remaining at very high levels, data from the Quarterly National 
Household Survey (QNHS) suggest some continued moderation in the fall in the 
number of people at work, with signs of sectoral stabilisation emerging. After 
declining by 38,000 in 2011, QNHS data for the first quarter of 2012 showed a fall 
in the total number of people at work of 18,000, when compared to the same 
period of 2011. The labour force also contracted in the first quarter, down by 
4,800 year-on-year after an annual average decline in 2011 of almost 26,000, 
while the participation rate, which stabilised last year at just over 60 per cent, is 
forecast to remain broadly unchanged.  
 
The latest QNHS data for the first quarter of 2012 reveal a headline 
unemployment rate of 14.8 per cent. Live Register data place unemployment at 
about the same rate in the period since. Employment continued to weaken in the 
first quarter across most sectors, although the pace of decline moderated and 
sectoral differences were apparent. It is now forecast that there will be an annual 
average level of employment in 2012 of 1,796,000, representing a fall of 12,000 
for the year as a whole. It is expected that the fall in aggregate employment in 
2012 will mask some stabilisation in private sectors other than in the services 
sector, where a reduction in the numbers employed in financial services is 
envisaged. Industrial employment should stabilise as growth in industrial output 
and exports continues, despite headwinds from the external environment. 
Construction employment is also likely to stabilise this year on the back of the 
investment stimulus, planned NAMA developments and construction work arising 
from FDI inflows (although much of these inflows are not expected to be 
particularly capital-intensive). Stronger economic growth in 2013 should see a 
more moderate fall in the numbers employed of just 5,000, signifying some 
degree of stabilisation in the overall labour market.  
 
Private and public sector employment trends have diverged more recently as an 
on-going consolidation of public finances continues to prompt reductions in the 
public sector, although private sector conditions appear less strained, when 
compared to previous years (see Figure 9). The QNHS release for the first quarter 
of 2012 estimated the impact of the additional temporary Census field staff 
employed during the first half of 2011 as adding 5,300 persons to the public 
sector workforce. When these are excluded, the Earnings and Labour Costs 
release shows that public sector numbers (including semi-state bodies) fell by 
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20,500 persons year-on-year in the second quarter of 2012 (14,900 as of the first 
quarter). A large share of this is on the back of the incentivised early retirement 
scheme. Excluding the weakened construction sector, where there was a fall of 
4,600 persons, private sector employment actually increased by 6,700 persons 
annually in the first quarter of 2012.  
 
FIGURE 9  Employment Changes Between Q1 2011 and Q1 2012 (Number of Persons) 
 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:   *Adjusted total public sector data excludes any decline owing to temporary Census staff. 
 
The number of persons on the Live Register has remained within a relatively 
narrow range for almost three years now. Looking through short- term volatility, 
this corroborates the view that some degree of stabilisation is evident in the 
labour market, despite sectoral divergences. A key feature of this stabilisation, 
however, is the continued fall in the labour force, with net outward migration 
lessening the impact of falling employment on headline numbers.  
 
Long-term unemployment represents a major concern with the number of 
persons unemployed for longer than one year close to 187,000 as of the first 
quarter of 2012, when compared to approximately 26,000 persons in the first 
quarter of 2007. As noted in the previous Commentary, males accounted for the 
largest increase in long-term unemployed during this period, with those aged 
between 25-34 years strongly represented. The share of long-term unemployed 
males with relatively high levels of educational attainment (i.e. Leaving Certificate 
or higher) has also increased, rising from just 36.5 per cent in the first quarter of 
2007 to 59.1 per cent in the final quarter of 2011, while for females the rate 
increased from 41.9 per cent to 74.4 per cent over the same period. 
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TABLE 7:  Employment and Unemployment
 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Agriculture 85 83 81 81 
Industry 360 342 338 340 
of which: Construction 120 107 103 103 
Services 1,403 1,385 1,376 1,372 
  
    Total at work 1,848 1,810 1,796 1,793
  
    Of which: non-agri. employees 1,446 1,427 1,421 1,422
Others 317 300 295 290 
  
    Unemployed 292 304 313 307
Labour Force 2,140 2,114 2,110 2,100 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.6 14.4 14.8 14.6 
Participation rate, % 61.3 60.7 60.3 60.3 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
The annual average number of unemployed in 2012 is expected to be higher than 
in 2011 at 313,000 and is expected to decline in 2013 to 307,000, see Table 7. 
Much of the decline over the two years is due to high emigration levels, with the 
participation rate relatively unchanged, with our forecasts implying a further 
labour force contraction in 2013. Employment opportunities are expected to 
remain subdued, with no significant thrust stemming from relatively less labour-
intensive growth in the expanding export sectors.  
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Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
The annual National Income and Expenditure Accounts show that the volume of 
goods and service imported declined by 0.3 per cent in 2011. In value terms total 
imports grew by 2.8 per cent, resulting in a price deflator for imports of 3.1 per 
cent. 
 
The value of goods imported in the first half of the year was marginally below that 
in the first half of 2011. Oil and gas imports were virtually unchanged but most 
other major categories of imports fell in value. Unfortunately, we have no price 
indices for imports for the same period but given the rise in basic energy prices 
and the depreciation of the euro, import prices must have increased so that the 
volume of imports has fallen. When imports by end-use are examined then a 
similar picture of decline in capital goods, consumer goods and materials for 
further production emerges – though the capital goods decline is relatively small.  
Looking at the time path there is a high degree of variability by month and by 
quarter so that trends are not obvious.  Imports rose sharply in the first quarter of 
the year from the levels in the second half of 2011, but fell back by 9 per cent in 
the second quarter. We think there may have been a stock cycle underway in the 
first half of the year and this may explain the relatively high level of imports in the 
first quarter and the decline in the second quarter. If this is the case, then imports 
could pick up in the second half of the year, but we are still forecasting a modest 
0.5 per cent volume decline in merchandise imports, with a price increase of 
about 3 per cent.  If this occurs then the carryover into 2013 will be positive. 
Given the profile for domestic and export demand, merchandise import volumes 
should then increase in 2013 and we are forecasting a rise of 5 per cent. 
 
TABLE 8 Imports of Goods and Services, % change, Volume 
 
 2011 2011 2012 2013 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % 
Merchandise 48.3 -2.3 -0.5 5.0 
Tourism 5.0 -7.2 -7.0 -3.0 
Other Services 78.2 1.4 4.5 6.3 
   
   Imports of goods and services 131.9 -0.3 2.2 5.5 
 
Note:   Value of total imports of goods and services includes FISM adjustment. 
Source: Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Service imports, as with service exports are much more difficult to predict.  The 
new service export companies have very big margins and very large volumes of 
business.  While they initially load a large gross margin into their Irish operations 
they tend to incur significant management charges in zero-tax countries, so that, 
although service exports are very large, so too are service imports.  This year such 
imports could increase by 4.5 per cent in volume, but next year the increase 
could be 6.3 per cent.  Tourism imports, on the other hand are set to fall this year 
by as much as 7 per cent. Next year the decline could be similar, as disposable 
income levels are expected to fall again. Overall, we expect imports of goods and 
services to rise by 2.2 per cent this year and 5.5 per cent in 2013. 
 
Net Factor Income 
Net factor income is the difference between two large gross flows and while it has 
often loosely been referred to as the profits of multinationals the size and 
composition of the gross flows indicate that it is much more than this.  On the 
debit side, direct investment income is important, but there is also considerable 
portfolio investment income. National debt interest paid abroad is not separately 
identified by heading (interest and other) but the total is given. On the debit side 
Irish multinationals also earn substantial amounts abroad and there are also 
significant flows of equity and interest on debt.  The following summarises the 
data for 2011. 
 
TABLE 9 Net Factor Payments 2011, € million 
 
 Credits Debits Net 
 € mn € mn € mn 
Total Direct Investment Income 14,573 41,114 26,541 
Income on Equity  
  - Dividends 1,697 13,888 12,191
- Reinvested Income  9,134 22,918 13,784 
Income on Debt 3,743 4,305 562 
   
  Portfolio Investment Income 23,141 30,571 7,430 
- Income on Equity 5,346 14,419 9,073 
- Income on debt 17,795 16,150 -1,645 
Other Investment Income 17,629 15,272 -2,357 
Compensation of employees 539 760 221 
Total (Factor Income BoP) 55,882 87,717 31,835 
Net Factor Income (National 
Accounts)  
 
31,977 
National Debt Interest 139 4,394 4,255 
 
 
Source:  Balance of International Payments Quarter 1 2012; National Income and Expenditure Annual Results for 2011, Central Statistics 
  Office. 
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Data for the first quarter of 2012 indicate that while total income inflows have 
increased income outflows have increased more rapidly. National debt interest 
payments were relatively stable in that quarter but are projected to increase very 
significantly for the year as a whole. Overall, we expect net factor income to 
increase by about €3.5 billion to €35.4 billion this year and by somewhat less in 
2013 if income levels and profits and dividends from abroad pick up. 
 
The Balance of Payments 
Revised Balance of Payments figures for 2010 put the Balance on Current Account 
surplus at €1.782 million or 1.4 per cent of GNP.  We expect an increase in the 
size of the surplus both this year and next, shown in Table 10. 
 
TABLE 10 Balance of Payments 
 
 2011 2012 2013 
 € bn € bn €bn 
Exports of goods and services 166.8 177.9 193.3 
Imports of goods and services 131.9 138.9 149.8 
Net factor payments -32.0 -35.5 -38.9 
Net transfers -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Balance on current account 1.8 2.3 3.3 
As a % of GNP 1.4 1.8 2.6 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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GDP and GNP 
 
We have argued in previous Commentaries that GDP is a poor measure of what is 
happening in the economy. The logic of this position is that transfer pricing 
between subsidiaries of multinationals leaves the profits’ figures based on tax 
planning rather than true arms length prices – whatever they may be in some 
cases. This situation may be further complicated by transfer pricing by way of 
management charges which have the effect of reducing GDP to minimise tax 
liabilities in Ireland. The complication arises in that the link between sales 
revenue and output is unclear. The fundamental point is that when we look at 
some components of net factor payments it is clear that while the profits of 
foreign multinationals are generated in Ireland they do not form part of income 
that accrues to people here. The element that accrues is the amount of 
corporation tax paid in Ireland by these firms as this is netted out from their 
profits. In spite of this GDP seems to be the preferred measure used by the Troika 
to evaluate economic performance. The rationale behind this seems to be based 
in the first instance on comparability across countries, i.e. we are using the same 
measures, so that if the concern is the level of the deficit or the debt, we are 
using equivalent relative measures. A second reason seems to be that it is 
believed that in principle net factor payments in some senses are taxable. Earlier 
we have shown that the net factor payments figure is the difference between two 
gross flows.  The inflow may already have been taxed and is subject to double tax 
agreements with other countries, while profit repatriations have been subject to 
Irish taxation.  If this were raised then, as we have seen, tax planning could easily 
eliminate the tax base.  National debt interest paid abroad is not subject to Irish 
taxation.  
 
Of much greater importance is the continuing increase in the gap between GDP 
and GNP (Figure 10). This is set to continue to increase, not least on foot of 
increased interest payments on the national debt. 
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FIGURE 10 GNP Relative to GDP (%) 
 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Domestic demand has declined each year since 2007 – the fall in 2009 being 
particularly marked at 11 per cent. By 2011 domestic demand was 21 per cent 
below the 2007 peak. This year we expect final demand to fall again, by 2.8 per 
cent, slightly less than in 2011, but next year the decline could be even lower at 
0.2 per cent.  
 
Sectoral Output 
A relatively low pace of expansion in manufacturing industries is expected in 
2012, with growth owing much to the resilience of the modern sector. In volume 
terms, the broad chemicals sector is likely to contribute the largest share of 
growth, where it appears that volumes may be broadly maintained in spite of 
patent expiries. Signs of growth amongst manufacturers involved in production of 
computer, electronic, optical and electrical equipment will also boost 
manufacturing output within the modern sector. The traditional sector, while 
faring less poorly in recent months, is still likely to show a decline in output for 
the year as a whole. Provided our expectations for some improvement in the 
international environment materialise next year, we forecast output in 
manufacturing to rise by 3.0 per cent in 2013, following a more subdued rise of 
just 2.3 per cent this year. Total industry (i.e. including building and construction) 
is likely to be less expansive this year as a result of weaknesses in the 
construction sector. These are likely to be offset by continued FDI inflows as well 
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as planned development by NAMA and the investment stimulus in 2013, so that 
the first expansion in six years is expected.  
 
Output in total services output is expected to rise marginally for 2012, up by 1.9 
per cent, with a slightly improved pace of expansion forecast in 2013 at 2 per 
cent. We expect that non-market services will be highly constrained, with falling 
numbers in public services prompting a sharper drop in the volume of public 
administration and defence this year. The cost of these early retirements is likely 
to cause this sector to expand in price terms for 2012. The absence of these early 
retirements next year will unwind this impact resulting in a reversal of the price 
deflator. Market services are still expected to rise in line with some recovery in 
the demand for international services and some substitution between public and 
private healthcare services remains likely. As such, we anticipate growth in other 
services volumes of 2.1 per cent and 2.2 per cent for 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
 
Gross output in agriculture may fall slightly this year. The poor weather 
conditions have adversely affected output – milk output for the first seven 
months is down 1.3 per cent. Grass growth and grain production have also been 
adversely affected and input prices are set to increase. 
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Monetary Sector Developments 
 
Bank Funding 
Since the last Commentary, recurrent tensions in the eurozone banking system, 
recently aggravated further by increased concerns relating to the recapitalisation 
of the Spanish banking system and elections in Greece, have had some negative 
impact on areas of bank funding in Ireland. This impact was visible in data 
covering all resident credit institutions (i.e. including IFSC operations), yet 
developments relating to the deposits of the Irish covered banks, which are of 
more significance, continue to show solid growth in deposits from households 
and businesses.5 Recent actions taken by the ECB and a €500 million issuance of 
treasury bills at considerably improved interest rates may also bode well for 
funding at the covered banks. 
 
While deposits in the entire set of credit institutions (including IFSC) have 
weakened this year, the situation for the covered Irish banks is far more 
favourable and reflects a return of some confidence in the system. Customer 
deposits (both resident and non-resident) increased by just over €14 billion in 
value since the trough of €140 billion in July 2011.6 Part of the reason for the 
recent increase comes from the weakness in the value of the euro vis-à-vis 
Sterling, a feature which has boosted the UK-sourced deposits. Central Bank data 
on deposits from credit institutions and central banks in the covered banks, 
however, (only available to end-March 2012) show that this side of the deposit 
base continued to shrink in the first quarter, falling by €3.1 billion to €124.6 
billion.7 Although deposit funding in the covered banks looks more benign of late, 
signs of disintegration in eurozone financial markets could weaken near-term 
prospects of obtaining renewed access to other private sector funding channels 
at sustainable levels. Progress in terms of the rehabilitation of distressed EU 
banks is on-going and is not expected to near completion before the end of next 
year,   while  progress  has  also  been  restricted  somewhat  by  the  breadth  of  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  The Covered Banks include AIB Group (including EBS Building Society), Bank of Ireland Group, Permanent TSB and 
IBRC. 
6  Note that these data come from the value series published by the Department of Finance. They exclude NTMA 
deposits held prior to re-capitalisation and AIB’s Polish operations, while they include the acquisition of Northern 
Rock deposits by Permanent TSB. 
7  These figures adjust for changes in non-transaction related effects such as changes in reporting populations, 
revaluations and exchange rates by analysing cumulative transactions data. 
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concurrent deleveraging operations.8 Moreover, the need to approach 
deleveraging primarily through large-scale asset reductions is further 
necessitated by the difficulties facing EU banks in terms of attracting additional 
capital in light of sustained adverse conditions. In this context, recent moves by 
the ECB to loosen collateral requirements, particularly instruments denominated 
in non-euro currencies such as sterling, are likely to help the covered banks to 
access finance at reduced costs. Renewed NTMA access to debt markets, which 
appears to have been met with some international demand, also bodes well for 
the capacity of the Irish banks to obtain market funding. 
 
Recourse to Emergency Liquidity Measures (ELM), which has replaced money 
market funding to a large extent, has declined at Irish covered banks, while the 
amount of ELM availed of by the overall group of domestic lenders (i.e. including 
foreign-owned banks) has remained broadly the same since the final quarter of 
last year. Total Eurosystem borrowing at the covered banks has fallen by more 
than a third since it reached a peak of €93.0 billion in January 2011 shortly after 
the EU-IMF programme commenced, amounting to some €60.9 billion as of end-
July 2012. Central Bank emergency liquidity assistance (accounted for under 
“other claims on eurozone credit institutions denominated in euro” on the 
financial statement of the Central Bank of Ireland) was €41.6 billion in July having 
declined in value by €2.6 billion since end-December 2011 and is down from a 
peak of €70.1 billion in February of last year. In a July statement, IMF staff noted 
that, while Irish banks recently obtained repo funding secured on UK collateral, 
future bond maturities may increase their reliance on Eurosystem funding, a 
development which may undermine prospects for a revival of lending. 
 
The ECB regards ELM financing as unsustainable and Irish covered banks are 
expected to complete deleveraging requirements by December 2013 (see Central 
Bank Financial Measures Programme Report, 2011) in order to wean themselves 
off such funding. This target seems achievable as of now and its attainment may 
well produce a smaller, cleaner banking system more conducive to sustainable 
funding under normal market conditions. However, financial systems remain 
strained and it is difficult to envisage a sustainable return to private financing for 
Irish banks until tensions in the eurozone are dealt with decisively. The 
downsizing of the Irish banking system will have little effect if reform 
commitments to break the link between sovereigns and banking systems, to 
create a eurozone banking union and to allow direct recapitalisation of eurozone 
banks through the ESM are not adequately implemented. With this in mind, the 
European Commission’s recent proposals for a unified banking supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8  Out of 58 key EU-based banks studied by the IMF, 24 announced detailed business plans indicating asset reduction 
measures amounting to some €2 trillion for the period 2012 to 2013. Three-quarters of the reduction measures are 
expected to come from sales of subsidiaries, securities and noncore assets, with the remainder likely to occur through 
a reduction in loans. See Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April 2012, pp.6,33. 
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mechanism represent another step in the right direction towards restoring 
confidence in the financial system. 
 
In addition to weaker profit opportunities owing to tightened interest margins, 
high cost structures and additional costs arising from the state guarantee of 
eligible liabilities, deteriorating asset quality also remains at the forefront of 
immediate problems facing Irish banks. Despite some reduced momentum in the 
rate of increase in mortgage arrears, the number of mortgages in repayment 
difficulties is likely to continue to increase through this year and next. The latest 
data for employment, incomes and rents offer some tentative evidence of 
stabilisation. This, combined with reduced interest rates is likely to be beneficial 
to developments in arrears in future, although research suggests that any 
immediate impact is unlikely to be felt over the short term.9 Instead, arrears are 
more likely to sustain an upward momentum before any positive influence from 
macroeconomic developments translates into a recovery in the number of 
mortgages in arrears.  
 
Recent Lending Developments: 
Irish household lending, once non-transaction related effects are accounted for, 
continued to decline in the first half of 2012, although the pace of decline is 
moderating slowly. Loans for house purchases were down 2.1 per cent in July, in 
annual terms, representing the slowest pace of decline since August 2010 (see 
Table 10).10 Underlying this fall, year-on-year declines available to March of this 
year show that lending for purchases of buy-to-let properties (-3.2 per cent) and 
holiday homes (-5.5 per cent) declined at a much faster pace than that directed 
towards owner principal dwellings (-2.1 per cent). Consumer credit also 
continued to fall substantially, down 11.0 per cent in July, year-on-year. 
 
Lending to Irish resident Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) has garnered a 
substantial degree of attention recently, due in part to the significance of SMEs 
for domestic employment and the relatively greater dependence such firms have 
on bank lending.11 Official data show that, after an accelerated contraction in the 
first quarter, the rate of contraction in lending to SMEs moderated in the second 
quarter, declining by 1.7 per cent, year-on-year. ‘Core lending’ (i.e. that which 
excludes financial intermediation and property related sectors) reveal a similar 
trend, although the rate of contraction is sharper than in the total, falling by 4.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9  See McCarthy, Y. and R. Lydon, 2011. “What Lies Beneath? Understanding Recent Trends in Irish Mortgage Arrears”, 
14/RT/11, Central Bank of Ireland. 
10  These figures adjust for changes in non-transaction related effects such as changes in reporting populations, 
revaluations and exchange rates. 
11  Recent evidence suggests that SMEs account for 72 per cent of private sector employment outside of construction 
and agriculture in Ireland (see Lawless, M., F. McCann and T. McIndoe-Calder, 2012. “SMEs in Ireland: Stylised facts 
from the real economy and credit market”. Conference paper, Central Bank of Ireland. 
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per cent in the second quarter of this year. While still pointing to a sharp 
contraction in outstanding lending, these figures represent the slowest rates of 
annual decline since the Central Bank started collecting data in March 2011. 
Underlying business lending activity for twelve of the main ‘core’ subsectors, as 
indicated by quarterly transactions data, show that the only subsectors to have 
recorded an increase in net lending (gross new lending less repayments) in the 
first half of 2012, when compared to the end of 2011, were primary industries 
(i.e. agriculture, forestry, logging, mining and quarrying), manufacturing 
(primarily chemicals sectors, rubber/plastic products, other non-metallic mineral 
products) the electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply subsector and the 
education subsector. The increase in net lending over the first half of 2012 to 
firms in these subsectors amounted to some €62 million, whereas the remaining 
nine ‘core’ subsectors recorded a substantial net decrease in lending of some 
€668 million since the end of 2011. Box 1 also examines firm-level survey data 
from the ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance, which suggests that Irish resident 
SMEs may currently be availing of non-traditional forms of lending to a greater 
extent than elsewhere in the eurozone. 
 
TABLE 11:  Lending to Irish Households and Irish Resident SMEs (% Change, Year-on-Year) 
 
 
Irish Household Lending Small and Medium Enterprise Lending 
 End-
Month 
All Lending  For House 
Purchases 
Consumer  
Credit 
Total Total excl. 
Financial 
Intermediation 
Total excl. Financial 
Intermediation & 
Property Related 
Sectors 
2009 Mar 6.0 7.8 -0.6 - - - 
 Jun 2.9 4.8 -3.6 - - - 
 Sep 0.2 1.9 -5.4 - - - 
 Dec -1.1 0.6 -7.3 - - - 
2010 Mar -2.6 -0.2 -10.6 - - - 
 Jun -4.5 -0.8 -13.1 - - - 
 Sep -4.5 -0.9 -14.1 - - - 
 Dec -5.5 -1.4 -21.1 - - - 
2011 Mar -5.0 -2.0 -15.0 -8.8 -11.3 -9.2 
 Jun -3.9 -2.2 -14.4 -9.1 -12.5 -10.6 
 Sep -4.0 -2.5 -13.7 -5.4 -8.2 -8.9 
 Dec -3.6 -2.5 -6.9 -3.0 -5.4 -6.2 
2012 Mar -3.9 -2.4 -11.6 -3.9 -4.9 -6.3 
 Jun -3.7 -2.2 -11.1 -1.7 -2.9 -4.6 
 Jul -3.6 -2.1 -11.0    
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland Money and Banking Statistics. 
 
Looking at the most recent qualitative data on supply and demand conditions, the 
ECB Bank Lending Survey for July 2012 suggests that, for Irish households, 
demand for loans for house purchases appears to have stabilised, having 
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moderated gradually from late-2008 onwards and experienced a modest easing 
in mid-2011. Credit standards attached to such lending, however, continue to 
tighten (see Figure 11).12 Risk perceptions in relation to expectations of general 
economic activity and housing market prospects appear to have been the 
foremost issues reported amongst lenders as contributing to tighter credit 
standards that have emerged since late 2011. Both factors have also been cited 
as proving more influential in tightening credit conditions during the three 
months to July, when compared to the previous two periods. 
 
The current signs of heightened risk aversion among credit institutions are largely 
predictable given that any evidence of a stabilisation in the residential property 
market is still very tentative and varies greatly depending on location. 
Furthermore, the capacity of borrowers to finance future repayments remains 
unusually uncertain now given the precariousness of the wider economic 
environment. 
 
FIGURE 11  Reported Change in Funding Conditions (2 Quarter Moving Average) 
 
 
Source:  ECB Bank Lending Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12  The ECB’s Eurozone Bank Lending Survey supplements existing quantitative data by giving some impression of the 
willingness of banks to lend, reflected in changes in their credit standards and in terms and conditions attached to 
loans or lines of credit. It is addressed to senior lending officers in participating banks, with over 100 eurozone banks 
participating in the survey on a voluntary basis each three month period, of which 5 are from Ireland. Changes in 
credit standards over the past three months are examined, with respondents indicating to what extent they feel that 
credit standards have deteriorated or eased over the recent quarter. 
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BOX 1: Alternative Financing in Irish SMEs 
by Eddie Casey 
 
Recent work from the Central Bank (McCann and Holton, 2012) highlighted the 
current difficulties facing Irish SMEs in terms of credit supply using two firm-level 
survey datasets. In particular, they note how Irish SMEs during the six month 
period to March 2012 reported the second highest rejection rates for credit 
applications in all eurozone countries, as well as showing how the share of 
discouraged borrowers (i.e. those who do not apply for credit despite having 
demand for it) is double the eurozone average. The survey evidence also fails to 
indicate demand conditions that are substantially lower than that visible 
elsewhere in the eurozone. This Box looks at just one of the survey datasets used 
in the above study, in order to highlight the extent to which SMEs may have 
turned to alternative, often more expensive, forms of financing. 
 
The ECB’s Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the eurozone (SAFE) 
provides a range of comparable firm-level survey findings every six months on 
financing conditions in the eurozone. SMEs here are defined as firms with 1-249 
employees. The findings from this report also appear to indicate a strained credit 
environment for Irish SMEs relative to eurozone counterparts, when analysed in 
terms of the alternative forms of financing sought more recently. The results in 
Table 1.1 show that during the six month period to March 2012, Irish SMEs were 
more than twice as likely to have reported availing of trade credit as a source of 
financing, when compared against the eurozone average and were almost one 
and a half times more likely to have availed of retained earnings or asset sales as 
alternatives. In addition, firms reported that they were 44 per cent more likely to 
have used sources of financing such as bank overdrafts, credit lines, or credit card 
overdrafts. Other loans (such as loans from family and friends or from a related 
company or shareholders, excluding trade credit) were also far more likely to be 
availed of, with 19 per cent of Irish SMEs reporting their usage in the past six 
months compared to the eurozone average of 13 per cent. The share of firms that 
reported using traditional bank loans, however, was actually above the reported 
eurozone average. Instead of indicating a high degree of substitution among Irish 
SMEs away from traditional bank loans in response to apparent credit 
constraints, these finding suggest that firms may require additional forms of non-
traditional financing over and above that available through traditional bank loans 
in light of current difficulties. 
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TABLE 1.1  Share of SMEs Reported to Have Used Various Forms of Finance in the Past Six Months for Normal 
Day-to-Day Business Operations or More Specific Projects or Investments 
 
 
Retained 
earnings or sale 
of assets 
Grants or 
subsidised 
bank loan 
Bank overdraft, 
credit line or 
credit cards 
overdraft Bank loan 
Trade 
credit Other loan 
Leasing or 
hire-purchase 
or factoring 
 Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank % 
1 PT 3.4 NL 6.6 GR 11.1 PT 22.6 FR 14.3 IT 7.5 GR 11.5 
2 FR 12.1 FR 8.7 FI 26.0 GR 25.3 DE 18.1 GR 7.5 BE 18.3 
3 NL 15.0 FI 11.6 PT 36.3 NL 29.2 AT 21.7 PT 7.6 ES 21.3 
4 BE 15.2 DE 13.1 BE 37.1 FI 30.8 PT 22.1 FR 7.8 PT 21.7 
5 GR 17.4 IE 13.4 ES 39.0 ES 34.7 BE 22.4 AT 12.5 IT 23.5 
6 IT 22.5 AT 14.5 DE 39.7 AT 35.1 NL 30.5 BE 17.1 IE 34.3 
7 ES 23.5 GR 14.6 FR 40.4 IT 35.3 ES 40.5 DE 17.5 FR 37.1 
8 DE 35.1 IT 14.7 AT 41.0 DE 35.9 GR 44.3 ES 18.1 NL 38.5 
9 IE 35.3 BE 16.4 NL 49.6 IE 36.5 IT 51.0 FI 18.2 FI 42.5 
10 AT 38.5 PT 17.8 IT 52.8 FR 38.8 FI 54.6 IE 18.6 AT 43.7 
11 FI 57.4 ES 18.7 IE 60.2 BE 40.5 IE 64.7 NL 22.8 DE 46.1 
Avg. EA 23.8 EA 13.5 EA 41.8 EA 34.7 EA 31.2 EA 13.3 EA 32.4 
 
Source:   European Central Bank: Survey of Access to Finance of Small and Medium Enterprises. 
 
The findings appear to be in line with research elsewhere showing that firms 
which are credit-constrained, either in the sense that applications for credit are 
denied or are not sought due to borrowers being discouraged, are more likely to 
obtain finance using both credit cards (Blanchflower and Evans, 2004) and trade 
credit (Peterson and Rajan, 1997). While these sources of funding are typically 
easier to obtain than traditional bank loans, they are also typically more 
expensive. More worryingly, research on new businesses in the US (Scott, 2009) 
showed that for every $1,000 increase in company credit card debt, the 
probability of a firm’s closure rose by 2.2 per cent. Such findings reveal the 
significance that various forms of business credit can have in determining the 
viability of a firm’s operations. 
 
Figure 1.1 offers some further explanation as to why SMEs may be seeking 
alternative sources of financing. A recent rise in the average interest rates on new 
business lending in Ireland, also visible in other peripheral eurozone economies, 
may be impacting on traditional borrowing. Irish rates on loans over 1 year, up  to 
€1 million in value are more closely aligned with those in Italy and Spain, with 
data from the ECB showing that Irish non-financial corporations were paying an 
average annual rate of 6.3 per cent on new lending as of July this year. This 
compares to an annual average rate of 4.6 per cent for both 2009 and 2010 and 
contrasts with German rates, which have fallen further more recently to just 3.6 
per cent, the lowest since ECB figures commenced in January 2003. 
Commentators have cited this as a symptom of reduced cross-border exposures, 
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which have contributed to increased average interest rates on new business 
lending in peripheral eurozone economies.13 
 
FIGURE 1.1  Average rate on new loans to non-financial corporations, over 1 year, up to €1m in value (%)
 
 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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10 
 
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
Economic Outlook 
GNP is forecast to decline by 0.2 per cent in real terms this year, unemployment 
will remain high at 14.8 per cent, the balance of payments surplus will increase, 
and the public finance targets, expressed as a percentage of GDP, are likely to be 
met. GDP itself is set to increase by 1.8 per cent. 
 
We have revised upwards the forecast for GNP growth in 2013. We are now 
forecasting that real GNP growth will amount to 0.7 per cent. GDP is forecast to 
grow more rapidly, at 2.1 per cent.  The drivers behind this growth are, on the 
external side, a more rapid growth in exports of both goods and services primarily 
due to the impact of new firms and new products from existing firms, while on the 
domestic demand side, the main contributor to growth will be a more positive 
outlook on the volume of investment, though the necessity for fiscal 
retrenchment is exerting significant downward pressure on domestic demand.  
 
The increase in investment is partly due to the impact of the announced 
government stimulus package. In our Summer Commentary we expressed our 
reservations about the benefits that would accrue to the Irish economy from a 
fiscal stimulus because of the open nature of the economy. The recent package is 
based on specific investment projects. Our reservations remain – the projects 
need to be subjected to cost-benefit analysis and should only go ahead if they 
meet the relevant criteria.  
 
These projects will have the effect of generating some economic activity in the 
localities of the projects and may also offer some employment for the 
construction sector, so there will be positive demand effects. The reliance of the 
Irish economy on imported materials means that, inevitably, some of the benefit 
will flow out of the economy, both directly through the projects and indirectly 
through expenditure of incomes. In addition, it must be recognised that the 
stimulus provided by such a package is short term in nature, with the main 
employment benefit being enjoyed in the years when most of the spending 
occurs. Furthermore, as the projects will be financed by asset sales or through the 
public private partnership mechanism, the package will not increase the national 
debt level. However, it is not clear at present as to how private sector 
involvement will be encouraged and how the private sector will achieve a 
sufficient return. 
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The persistence of long-term unemployed numbers is a serious concern, with 
those in long-term unemployment (i.e. over one year) accounting for nearly 61 
per cent of total unemployment in the first quarter of this year. Rather than 
implementing an investment stimulus, which is likely to yield a modest and highly 
transient boost to construction sector employment, further measures to help 
firms overcome the constraints they face, for instance measures to improve SME 
lending and to facilitate effective individual training programmes, might be better 
suited to redirecting resources towards sectors of the economy where the jobs 
are more sustainable in the long run.14 
 
The Public Finances 
The fiscal consolidation programme agreed with the Troika requires cuts in 
expenditure and increases in taxation to reduce the General Government Balance 
to about 3 per cent of GDP by 2015.  This year the required adjustment is €3.8 
billion (€1.6 billion in tax changes and €2.2 billion in expenditure changes) and in 
aggregate the targets set are likely to be met.  For 2013 the required total 
consolidation amount is €3.5 billion of which €2.25 billion relates to expenditure 
cuts and €1.25 billion to revenue growth.  For 2014 and 2015 respectively the 
total consolidation amounts are €3.1 billion and €2.0 billion respectively.  
 
Tax Changes 
For 2013 the carryover from tax changes in previous years is counted as part of 
the consolidation.  From Budget 2012 this is estimated at €0.3 billion so that new 
measures amounting to €0.95 billion are needed. The proposed first stage of the 
property tax, if the rate is set at 0.25 per cent, would lead to additional revenue of 
some €0.5 billion.  The remaining gap can be partially filled by a reform of the 
vehicle registration tax  scheme introduced in mid-2008, so that it has the effect 
of achieving its original objective of being revenue neutral (there were serious 
revenue losses associated with its introduction) and by an associated reform of 
the annual vehicle taxation.   
 
During the period of the boom the income tax base was eroded by a policy 
designed specifically to reduce the numbers liable to income tax. By 2010 some 45 
per cent of income earners were not liable for income tax (Budget 2011).  This 
was financed by unsustainable property associated taxes. This policy needs to be 
reversed. The Universal Social Charge was introduced to partially address this. 
Changes in tax credits and in the width of relevant bands could also increase the 
tax base. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14  The Government estimates that the number of jobs generated by the stimulus will be in the region of 13,000, while 
the number of persons unemployed in the first quarter of 2012 totalled 309,000. It is also not certain that these jobs 
will necessarily be filled by individuals who are currently unemployed. 
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Expenditure Changes  
The successful sale of Irish government debt by the NTMA indicating the 
willingness of international investors to invest in Ireland represents an important 
milestone in the recovery of the Irish economy.  However, while this willingness is 
a positive development, it does not lessen the need for continued reform and 
public expenditure cuts. Indeed, the success of the measures to date to rebalance 
the public finances has contributed to the ability to raise funds internationally.  
Despite the progress that has been made, there remains a significant amount of 
adjustment and reform that has to occur to achieve the substantial reductions 
that are still required.  
 
At a macro level the scale of the cuts in expenditure is easy to see. At a micro level 
it is more difficult to see where cuts should be made. At the beginning of the 
downturn there was a view that there was serious waste in the public sector and 
the elimination of this could be undertaken with relative ease. Even where there 
is still some obvious waste, cutting this inevitably involves cutting employment 
directly or indirectly through reduced expenditure.  It is hard to think of cuts that 
will not leave some people unaffected.  The main question is which group will be 
affected.  We have looked at the main areas of expenditure by major spending 
heads. 
 
TABLE 12  Main Heads of Government Expenditure, 2011, € million 
 
 Education Health Social 
Security 
Total Other Grand 
Total 
 € million 
Subsidies - - - - 639 639 
Current transfer payments 1,541 2,383 20,646 24,570 3,749 28,319 
Current Expenditure on goods 
and services 
6,571 10,473 891 17,935 9,176 27,111 
Capital grants to enterprises - - - - 6,060 6,060 
(283)* 
Gross physical capital formation 524 248 80 852 3,397 4,249 
Other capital expenditure 66 5 3 74 2,255 2,329 
National Debt Interest - - -  5,142 5,142 
Total 8,702 13,109 21,620 43,431 30,418 73,849 
(68,072)* 
 
Source:  National Income and Expenditure Accounts 2011.  
  *excludes funds for the recapitalisation of banks. 
 
Current transfer payments account for almost 42 per cent, while current 
expenditure on goods and services accounts for almost 40 per cent, of total 
underlying (i.e. excluding recapitalisation cost) expenditure.  Given that 
government has no leeway in relation to national debt interest payments, the 
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bulk of the adjustment to current expenditure must come from these two 
categories of expenditure. Education and health expenditure account for just less 
than two-thirds of current expenditure on goods and services, so that it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that further cuts in these areas are inevitable.  
 
Over two-thirds of transfer payments arise in the provision of social security and 
other welfare payments, so it is difficult to see how further reductions in these 
headings of expenditure can be avoided also.   
 
The situation is particularly difficult in that social security and welfare expenditure 
is very demand driven. If unemployment increases then expenditure must rise. 
Similarly, in healthcare if the number entitled to medical cards increases then 
expenditure must rise. If total expenditure in these areas is to be contained there 
are several alternatives. For example, total cash limits could be imposed – in 
terms of welfare this would mean that per capita payments would decline or 
eligibility would be reduced. In terms of healthcare, people might not get 
treatment once the cash limits have been reached or rules of entitlement could 
be changed, reducing the eligibility of the population to particular public health 
services. Alternatively, given that these services are demand driven, cuts and 
productivity gains under the Croke Park Agreement could be used to finance the 
expenditure.   
 
The principle behind the Croke Park Agreement is that pay rates in the public 
service, including education and most of health, would not be cut further, but that 
reorganisation, removal of restrictive practices and increased productivity, would 
allow services to be more or less maintained as numbers declined. There are 
obvious difficulties with this in particular cases, as for example where the sole 
teacher of a subject in a school retires or a particular skill is lost in a hospital or 
primary care centre. However, with some flexibility and a continuation of early 
retirement options, it may be possible to effect further significant pay cost 
savings. For this to happen the pace of change would need to be accelerated and 
realistic estimates produced on savings. This would provide the basic information 
required to see what other adjustments are needed on pay, public sector 
employment and other expenditure.   
 
The precise cuts in public expenditure that are implemented reflect political 
judgement about the relative merits of different forms of expenditure. If all 
expenditure had equal marginal benefits, even at the political level, then 
expenditure cutting would be relatively easy as across the board cuts would 
suffice. Detailed analysis, as set out in the Report of the Special Group on Public 
Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (July 2009) and, more recently, the 
Comprehensive Expenditure Report suggests that using judgement about 
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programmes could minimise the damage to services. Whether action is based on 
across-the-board decisions, or based on judgement, these cuts need to be 
implemented. 
 
Other Policy Considerations 
The effect of fiscal consolidation of €3.5 billion in 2013 is to reduce domestic 
demand and output growth. Some part of the consolidation includes the 
carryover from tax measures introduced this year so that new measures 
introduced in the budget for next year would be about €3.2 billion or about 2.5 
per cent of GNP. The effect on the economy depends, not just on the direct 
demand impact, but also on the reaction of the household and corporate sector. 
The latter is likely to be more favourable next year as foreign direct investment 
has remained strong. The commitment to correcting the public finances remains 
an important indicator of stability and hence contributes to the flow of foreign 
investment. 
 
A feature of the forecasts, which highlights the difficulty arising from a continued 
use of borrowing, is that while total government expenditure is virtually 
unchanged over the forecast period, debt service costs rise so that the remainder 
of expenditure has to be cut. With continued borrowing, debt service costs are set 
to increase further and in the absence of growth will eat into other expenditure. 
There remains a significant primary budget deficit (i.e. the general government 
balance excluding interest payments – in 2012 €13.2billion-€6.3billion= 
€6.9billion). The dynamics of the debt are still working against the economy and 
while the primary deficit will fall to €3.4billon in 2013, it is still dragging economic 
growth down because of the need to contain the deficit by tax increases and 
expenditure cuts. 
 
The recently announced policy shift by the ECB is a step in the right direction and 
should keep yields on government paper closer to real long-run numbers. There 
are still considerable short-comings in the eurozone financial system as the 
wholesale money market is not functioning properly. Some part of this reflects 
the perceived undercapitalisation of the banking system and concerns about 
future banking losses associated with exposure to countries where the debt 
overhang will continue to exert pressure on national budgets, corporate profits, 
and household debt. The failure of the wholesale money market to function and 
the subsequent assumption of that function by the ECB lies behind the attempts 
to deleverage the Irish banking system. This is effectively reducing resources for 
bank lending. While the use of the ESM to provide funds for recapitalisation 
across the eurozone is welcome in that it will divorce bank and sovereign debt, 
there needs to be some retrospection covering the banking debt incurred in 
Ireland. The details in relation to recapitalisation need to be considered carefully 
as debt for equity swaps may not be ideal. 
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Finally, while any relief on the debt issue is to be welcomed it needs to be 
remembered that the budget deficit is still very substantial. The level of debt also 
reflects the collapse of the economy from previous unsustainable levels. Thus 
while debt relief, of some aspects of the bank-related debt, would make life easier 
it would not resolve the budget problem. It is cautionary to remember that even if 
there were no debt and hence no interest payments, the budget deficit would still 
be large – day-to-day expenditure continues to outstrip revenue. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 82.6 2.7 2.7 84.9 4.0 3.0 88.3 9.2 6.0 96.4 
Tourism 3.1 5.6 4.0 3.3 4.7 2.8 3.4 5.2 3.5 3.6 
Other Services 71.2 9.8 7.9 78.2 9.6 8.5 85.7 8.2 6.5 92.7 
Exports Of Goods and Services 156.9 6.0 5.1 166.3 6.7 5.6 177.4 8.6 6.2 192.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.9 
  
0.5 
  
0.5 
  
0.6 
Adjusted Exports 157.8 5.7 5.1 166.8 6.7 5.6 177.9 8.6 6.2 193.3 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.6 -15.4 -11.9 3.9 -18.9 -18.9 3.2 1.0 0.0 3.2 
Other Building 5.8 -21.8 -21.8 4.5 -6.8 -7.2 4.2 10.9 10.0 4.7 
Transfer Costs 0.4 4.9 31.3 0.4 -8.9 -10.0 0.3 -10.7 -12.0 0.3 
Building and Construction 10.8 -18.2 -15.8 8.8 -12.2 -12.6 7.7 5.9 4.7 8.2 
Machinery and Equipment 8.0 -8.5 -8.3 7.3 2.7 3.4 7.5 2.5 3.5 7.7 
Total Investment 18.7 -14.0 -12.6 16.1 -5.5 -5.4 15.2 4.2 4.1 15.9 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 2.6 27.1 0.7 3.2 -8.0 -0.3 3.0 7.5 0.2 3.2 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.7 -1.4 -0.9 67.8 -0.1 -0.1 67.7 -0.3 -0.2 67.5 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 12.5 -7.8 -1.0 11.5 -4.4 -0.5 11.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 
Total Income Received 83.7 -1.4 -1.2 82.5 -1.0 -0.8 81.7 0.1 0.0 81.7 
Current Transfers 25.2 2.3 0.6 25.8 -1.7 -0.4 25.4 -2.7 -0.7 24.7 
Gross Personal Income 109.0 -0.6 -0.6 108.4 -1.2 -1.3 107.1 -0.6 -0.6 106.5 
Direct Personal Taxes 20.9 7.3 1.5 22.4 2.6 0.6 23.0 2.4 0.6 23.6 
Personal Disposable Income 88.1 -2.4 -2.1 85.9 -2.2 -1.9 84.1 -1.4 -1.2 82.9 
Consumption 82.1 -0.9 -0.8 81.3 -0.5 -0.4 80.9 -0.4 -0.3 80.6 
Personal Savings 6.0 -23.2 -1.4 4.6 -31.4 -1.5 3.2 -27.3 -0.9 2.3 
Savings Ratio 6.8 
  
5.4 
  
3.8 
  
2.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 19.2 
  
20.7 
  
21.5 
  
22.1 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A4 Public Finances, Exchequer 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
Outcome, €bn Outcome, €bn Outcome, €bn Forecast, €bn Forecast, €bn 
Net Current Expenditure 45.2 47.0 48.0 51.1 50.9 
Net Voted Expenditure 40.3 40.5 41.4 42.5 41.5 
Non-Voted Expenditure 5.0 6.5 6.6 8.6 9.4 
Current Revenue 33.9 34.4 36.8 38.7 39.0 
Tax Revenue 33.0 31.8 34.0 36.0 37.0 
Non-Tax Revenue 0.8 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.0 
Current Budget Surplus -11.4 -12.6 -11.2 -12.4 -11.9 
Capital Resources 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.8 1.8 
Capital Expenditure 14.7 8.0 16.2 7.5 4.0 
Capital Expenditure – Voted 6.9 5.9 4.3 4.1 3.0 
Capital Expenditure - Non Voted  7.8 2.0 11.9 3.4 1.0 
Capital Borrowing -13.3 -6.2 -13.7 -5.7 -2.3 
Exchequer Balance -24.6 -18.7 -24.9 -18.1 -14.1 
as % of GDP -15.3 -12.0 -15.7 -11.2 -8.5 
General Government Balance -22.5 -48.4 -20.2 -13.1 -12.4 
as % of GDP -13.9 -30.9 -12.7 -8.1 -7.5 
 
FORECAST TABLE A5 Public Finances, National Accounts 
 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn € bn 
Total Receipts : Current 51.1 57.7 60.3 56.8 49.8 49.8 50.5 51.4 52.6 
Total Receipts : Capital 4.0 5.6 6.0 3.6 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.2 1.7 
Total Receipts - Current And Capital 55.1 63.2 66.4 60.4 51.4 50.6 51.9 53.6 54.3 
Total Expenditure – Current 45.2 49.8 55.5 60.7 62.7 61.7 61.2 61.7 61.8 
Total Expenditure – Capital 7.2 8.2 10.7 12.8 11.2 37.3 10.7 5.0 4.9 
Total Expenditure - Current And Capital  52.4 58.0 66.2 73.5 73.9 99.0 71.9 66.7 66.7 
General Govt. Balance 2.7 5.2 0.2 -13.1 -22.5 -48.4 -20.2 -13.1 -12.4 
As % of GDP 1.6 2.9 0.1 -7.3 -13.9 -30.9 -12.7 -8.1 -7.5 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A6 Imports of Goods and Services 
 
 
2010 % change in 2011 2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 46.9 3.0 -2.3 48.3 2.5 -0.5 49.5 7.9 5.0 53.4 
Tourism 5.4 -6.1 -7.2 5.0 -4.2 -7.0 4.8 -1.5 -3.0 4.7 
Other Services 75.6 3.5 1.4 78.2 7.6 4.5 84.2 8.4 6.3 91.3 
Imports of Goods and Services 127.8 2.9 -0.3 131.5 5.3 2.2 138.5 7.9 5.5 149.4 
FISM Adjustment 0.5 
  
0.3 
  
0.4 
  
0.4 
Adjusted Imports 128.3 2.8 -0.3 131.9 5.3 2.2 138.9 7.9 5.5 149.8 
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FORECAST TABLE A7 Balance of Payments 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 166.8 177.9 193.3 
Imports of Goods and Services 131.9 138.9 149.8 
Net Factor Payments -32.0 -35.5 -38.9 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 
Balance on Current Account 1.8 2.3 3.3 
As a % of GNP 1.4 1.8 2.6 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A8 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 85 83 81 81 
Industry 360 342 338 340 
Of which: Construction 120 107 103 103 
Services 1,403 1,385 1,376 1,372 
Total at Work 1,848 1,810 1,798 1,793 
Unemployed 292 304 313 307 
Labour Force 2,140 2,114 2,111 2,100 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.6 14.4 14.8 14.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Notes 
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Trends in Irish Exports 
 
David Duffy and Eddie Casey 
 
Introduction 
Exports of both Irish goods and Irish services have performed well over much of 
the recession. Indeed, it is net trade that has ensured that there has been growth 
in the Irish economy. Figure 1.1 shows the contribution to economic growth over 
the past number of years. What is evident is the contribution that net trade has 
made to growth. At a time when domestic demand has been contracting the 
external sector has been the sector of the economy that has been growing. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 Contributions to GDP Growth, Constant Prices (Percentage Points, Year-on-Year) 
 
 
 
Sources:  Calculations based on data from Central Statistics Office, National Income and Expenditure Accounts and ESRI forecasts. 
 
The Quarterly National Accounts also provides data on trade in goods and in 
services. Over the time span of the data, exports in services have shown steady 
growth, narrowing the gap with goods exports. Interestingly, the preliminary data, 
for the final quarter of 2011, which is subject to revision, shows that, in volume 
terms, exports of services exceeded those of goods volumes for the first time, 
although the surplus was small. 
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FIGURE 1.2 Trade in Goods and Services, Quarterly National Accounts, Constant Prices (Euro, billions) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts. 
 
Exports of Goods 
Data from the Central Statistics Office allows us to examine trends in the 
countries to which we export and the products we export. In terms of value, more 
than three-quarters of goods exported in 2011 went to the eurozone, US and UK. 
The eurozone accounted for the largest share of exports comprising almost 35 per 
cent of all goods exported in 2011, while the US (23 per cent) and the UK (16 per 
cent) also comprised a major share of Irish trade in the goods sector. Figure 1.3 
shows the evolution in terms of the destinations for Irish goods exports over 
selected years between 1990 and 2011. The bulk of exports shipped to US and EU 
countries other than the UK are typically foreign-sector exports, while most 
indigenous-firm exports go to the United Kingdom. In 2010, for example, 
indigenous exports amounted to some €12.4 billion, with foreign-owned firms 
accounting for €114.6 billion. The latter, equating to a share of roughly 90 per 
cent of the total, has remained largely unchanged since 2001 (Forfás, 2012).  
 
In terms of the commodities that are exported, the vast majority relate to the 
broad chemicals sector, where a rapidly growing share has emerged in recent 
years. In 2011, €56.1 billion of the total €91.7 goods exported internationally were 
in chemicals and related products, signifying a rise in the share from just 16 per 
cent of goods exported from Ireland in 1990 to 61 per cent in 2011. The other 
major category, albeit one that has been in decline more recently, is that of 
machinery and transport equipment, within which office machines/automatic 
data processing equipment and electrical machinery/appliances, etc. are key 
components. The decline in these subsectors in the late 1990s and on into the 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1998Q1 2000Q1 2002Q1 2004Q1 2006Q1 2008Q1 2010Q1 2012Q1€(
bi
llio
ns
)
Export of Goods Import of Goods Export of Services Import of Services
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 2 |  5 5  
 
early part of the new millennium, particularly in the areas of computer hardware, 
reflected an increasing preference among foreign-owned manufacturing firms to 
either downsize or relocate assembly operations away from Ireland to lower-wage 
economies. Among others, Apple, IBM and Intel shifted labour-intensive 
motherboard assembly activities from Ireland to economies such as those in the 
Far East, while some element of substitution into related services sectors and 
more highly skilled manufacturing activities was visible domestically (Barry and 
Van Egeraat, 2005). This decline coincided with a shift in the growth dynamic of 
the Irish economy towards a credit-fuelled property bubble in 2002 and a sharp 
rise in Irish relative unit labour costs during the period 2001 to 2008 (O’ Brien and 
Scally, 2012) in the order of over 42 per cent. As highlighted by Casey (2012), 
however, these competitiveness losses have tended to be more persistent in 
manufacturing sectors of the economy typically classed as ‘traditional’ (primarily 
comprised of food and beverage subsectors) since the recent downturn began. 
Lost momentum relating to inward investment during this time accompanied the 
significant declines in overseas earnings by manufacturers located in Ireland. 
More recently, weakened performance in this subsector was further compounded 
by the closure of Dell’s manufacturing operations in Ireland in 2009. 
 
Food, live animals and beverages’ exports make up another large and relatively 
stable share of goods traded (averaging 10 per cent of total goods exported since 
2000) as do various miscellaneous manufactured articles, with medical devices a 
major subcategory here. Reflecting the significance of the ‘modern sector’, the 
latest data from the Irish Exporters Association (2012) show that eight of the 
twenty-one largest export companies in Ireland (in terms of turnover) are from 
the ICT sector, with computer services exports heavily represented; seven are 
from the pharmaceutical/medical devices sector, while three are from the agri-
food sector. 
FIGURES 1.3 AND 1.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:   CSO and OECD.               Sources:   CSO and OECD. 
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Exports of Goods to the Eurozone 
Looking at the changing composition of exports destined for eurozone countries, 
it is clear that the bulk of goods exported in recent times have become dominated 
by modern industries. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals’ exports, having 
represented a modest share (13.1 per cent) of Irish exports to the eurozone in 
1990, accounted for over two-thirds (67 per cent) of all goods exported to 
eurozone economies in 2011 (see Figures 1.5 and 1.6). The same industries 
represented close to €31 billion in goods exported from Ireland to eurozone 
member states in 2011, up from €1.1 billion in 1990 and €10 billion in 2000. The 
contrast with food and live animal exports is substantial, where exports 
equivalent to €1.7 billion in 1990 have since risen by just €1.4 billion. Various 
high-tech exports classified under the headings of optical, photo, technical, 
medical apparatus, etc. represented some €3 billion (7 per cent) of total exports in 
2011 and have slowly grown in importance during the previous two decades. 
Exports of computers, machinery, mechanical appliances and similar products also 
increased in terms of their share of total Irish goods exported to eurozone 
economies during the same period. More recently, however, closures of key firms 
in the industry and a winding down in the scale of operations caused a sizeable 
deterioration in exports related to these areas. A peak of €9.5 billion (19 per cent) 
of total goods exports in these industries had fallen to less than one-third of that 
by 2011 in value terms standing at €3 billion (6.6 per cent). Exports of goods in the 
areas of electrical and electronic equipment met a similar fate earlier in the 
decade, down from over €5 billion in nominal terms to half of that in 2011 at €2.3 
billion (signifying a collapse in the share of total exports to the eurozone from 
18.3 per cent of the total to just 5.1 per cent). 
 
FIGURES 1.5 AND 1.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:    OECD.                  Source:   OECD. 
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Exports of Goods to the US 
The importance of the US as a trade destination for Ireland has been a key feature 
of the changing landscape in Irish manufacturing over recent years. Between 1990 
and 2011, the share of exports from Ireland to the US rose from 8.2 per cent of 
total goods exports to 23.1 per cent. During this time, the increasing 
predominance of sectors involved in the production of chemicals and related 
products together with manufacturers of medical devices has been staggering. 
Having accounted for just over one-third (36.5 per cent) of all exports in 1990, 
these sectors combined now produce over 90 per cent of total goods exported to 
the US, in value terms. Their contribution to the growth in the value of goods 
exports to the US over the last two decades is emphasised further by the fact that 
some €19 billion of the €20 billion increase in exports since 1990 can be attributed 
to growth in these sectors alone (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8). 
 
FIGURES 1.7 AND 1.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: CSO and Eurostat. 
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with the British market accounting for just 15.6 per cent of total goods exported 
in 2011. Underlying this apparent reallocation, however, there remains a 
considerable reliance on the UK market for indigenous exporters. 
 
Although the export share related to the broad chemicals sector has increased in 
importance in recent years (see Figure 1.9), the UK market is still relatively 
diversified as regards Irish goods’ exports. Chemicals and related products 
accounted for 35.6 per cent of all goods exports to the UK in 2011, up from 10 per 
cent in 1990. The next largest component is exports of food and live animals, 
representing close to one-quarter (24.5 per cent) of all goods exported to the UK 
in 2011. This subsector has been a relatively stable source of trade for the Irish 
economy, with the bulk of exports here consisting of agri-food produce. Various 
manufactured articles classified as miscellaneous items, but primarily consisting of 
optical media, medical devices, plastic goods, printed materials and items of 
clothing make up another 10 per cent of the overall share of exports. A further 10 
per cent is accounted for by machinery and transport equipment producing 
manufacturers, although the share of exports here has seen a considerable 
decline in the last decade, as discussed earlier, declining from a peak of 44.4 per 
cent of all exports to the UK in 2000. This decline has provided the major 
contribution to falling goods’ exports to the UK over this period (see Figure 1.10). 
 
FIGURES 1.9 AND 1.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSO and Eurostat.                                                                                               
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As highlighted by Barry and Van Egeraat (2005), some manufacturing activities in 
the ICT sectors that experienced outsourcing or relocation by multinationals in the 
late 1990s and 2000s were offset by a restructuring into related services sectors. 
This has been a sustained feature of the evolving export sector in Ireland, 
reflected in the amount of new services-sector FDI projects attracted to here 
more recently as well as in the changing share of employment in manufacturing, 
when compared to services sectors. Employment data for ICT sectors from Forfás 
(2012) reveal that the numbers employed in computer, electronic and optical 
equipment manufacturing sectors declined by 5,600 between 2002 and 2011, yet 
this was almost entirely offset by a rise in ICT related services sectors of just over 
5,500 during the same period.  
 
Trends in Service exports 
Increasingly the service sector and service sector exports have become more 
important in the Irish economy, with exports of services amounting to €81.4 
billion in 2011.  Balance of Payments statistics allow some insight into what 
sectors contribute to services exports. The data for trade in services shows that 
Ireland has had a deficit in service trade in the past, although this narrowed 
substantially in 2011.  
 
The same data can be used to see what Ireland’s most important service exports 
are. Figure 1.12, using data for selected years, shows that computer services, e.g. 
computer software and software licences, are the main service export, accounting 
for 39 per cent of service exports in 2011.  
FIGURE 1.11 Trade in Services, Current Prices 
 
 
Source:  CSO, Balance of Payments. 
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FIGURE 1.12 Service Exports by Sector, as % of Total Service Exports, Current Prices 
 
 
Source: CSO, Balance of Payments. 
 
Not only are computer services our largest service sector export, but we have 
consistently enjoyed a surplus on trade in this component. In recent times there 
has also been a surplus on the export of transport services, and insurance 
services, see Figure 1.13. 
 
FIGURE 1.13 Service Exports by Sector, Euro Million, Current Prices 
 
 
Source:  CSO, Balance of Payments. 
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A more recent CSO release on service trade, extending what was previously 
available in the Balance of Payments data, provides us with some insights into our 
service export markets. This is summarised in Table 1.1. It is evident that Europe is 
the main market for Irish service exports, accounting for close to 64 per cent of 
service exports in 2011, a small decline on the proportion for 2009 and 2010. 
Although the UK has become less important as a destination for goods exports, it 
is our most important single country market, accounting for 18.5 per cent of total 
service sector exports, higher than for goods exports which stands at 15.7 per 
cent. Asia is an important market for service exports, accounting for €8.6 billion in 
2011, equivalent to 10.5 per cent of total service exports. The data shows that in 
2011 services exports to China accounted for nearly 26 per cent of Ireland’s Asian 
service exports. The USA, at 7.2 per cent, is also an important market, though not 
as large a market as it is for goods exports. 
 
TABLE 1.1 Service Exports by Destination 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 
 
2009 2010 2011 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
 
% % % 
Europe 46.6 49.7 52.0 
 
69.4 66.9 63.8 
of which: 
       Belgium 1.6 1.2 1.4 
 
2.4 1.6 1.8 
France 4.5 4.8 4.8 
 
6.7 6.5 5.9 
Germany 6.6 7.8 7.7 
 
9.8 10.4 9.4 
Italy 4.3 4.2 4.7 
 
6.4 5.6 5.7 
Luxembourg 0.8 1.1 1.0 
 
1.3 1.4 1.2 
Netherlands 3.1 3.4 3.4 
 
4.6 4.5 4.1 
Spain 2.3 2.5 2.4 
 
3.4 3.4 3.0 
Sweden 1.2 1.3 1.8 
 
1.8 1.7 2.2 
Switzerland 1.7 1.7 3.7 
 
2.5 2.3 4.6 
UK 13.6 14.6 15.1 
 
20.3 19.7 18.5 
 
0.6 0.6 1.1 
 
0.9 0.8 1.4 
Canada 4.3 5.5 5.8 
 
6.4 7.4 7.2 
USA 2.3 2.4 1.9 
 
3.4 3.2 2.3 
Central America 0.4 0.4 0.6 
 
0.6 0.5 0.7 
South America 5.7 7.2 8.6 
 
8.6 9.6 10.5 
Asia 1.1 1.3 1.3 
 
1.7 1.8 1.6 
Africa 0.7 1.1 
  
1.1 1.5 
 Oceania 5.4 6.2 8.6 
 
8.0 8.3 10.5 
Other 67.1 74.3 81.4 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
46.6 49.7 52.0 
 
69.4 66.9 63.8 
 
Source: Calculations based on CSO data. 
Note: % are of total service exports.  
 
Although the CSO have to suppress the data for some sectors and countries for 
confidentiality reasons, the data allows us to get some insights into what service 
exports go to our main markets. Computer services were the main service export 
to the UK in 2011 at €4 billion, followed by transport services, €2.5 billion. Our 
main markets for computer service exports were Germany at €4.9 billion in 2011, 
the UK at €4 billion, Asia at €3.6 billion and France at €2.5 billion. The top three 
62  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  A ut um n  20 1 2 
 
markets for insurance exports were the UK, €2 billion, Italy €1.7 billion, and the 
USA, at €1.1 billion.  
 
Outlook 
Using medium-term growth forecasts from the IMF for Ireland’s major 
international trading partners, it is possible to get a sense of the immediate 
growth prospects likely for our principal export markets. Table 1.2 classifies these 
economies into three categories (high, moderate and low growth) based on the 
IMF forecasts, while also showing the share and value of goods exported to each 
economy in both 2007 and 2011 derived from detailed CSO trade statistics. 
 
Table 1.2 illustrates how a large concentration (almost 93 per cent) of Irish traded 
goods were destined for markets in 2011 that are likely to have low or moderate 
growth prospects over the next five years, giving  a clear indication of the 
difficulties faced by Irish exporting manufacturers in the current environment. Of 
particular concern is the fact that the eurozone, the largest destination for Irish 
goods exports, represents the economy with the most sluggish outlook for growth 
out of all of Ireland’s major trading partners. In addition, the indications for the US 
and the UK, Ireland’s next largest export markets, point to fairly moderate 
demand growth over the next five years, with both economies positioned towards 
the low end of the moderate growth spectrum (defined here as annual growth in 
the region of an average of 2 to 4 per cent). Taken together, almost 87 per cent of 
our major export markets are likely to have annual average GDP growth rates of 3 
per cent or lower over the period 2012 to 2017. 
 
In assessing the outlook for Irish trade one issue is the effect on trade statistics of 
drugs manufactured here coming off-patent. Trade statistics for the first six 
months of the year show a €1.3 billion decline in exports of medical and 
pharmaceutical products, much of which is attributed by analysts to the drug 
Lipitor coming off patent. The manufacture of cheaper generic drugs will reduce 
the value of exports, (with a corresponding reduction in profit and in net factor 
outflows). However, the impact on the volume of exports is less certain. If the 
pharmaceutical company continues to locate the production of its generic 
alternative in Ireland the impact on the volume of pharmaceutical exports will not 
be as great as the impact on the value.  
 
The difficulties faced in terms of firms breaking into new export markets where 
rapid growth potential exists is evidenced by the small share of exports to areas 
such as China, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia. Traditionally, barriers such as 
geographical distance, the lack of a common language, internal geography 
(typically measured as population density), business or import costs associated 
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with specific export markets and relatively weaker communications 
infrastructures have been highlighted as variables which may explain the lack of 
progress in terms of the number of firms accessing such markets (for example, see 
Lawless, 2009). 
 
TABLE 1.2 Key Export Regions Classified By Medium Term Growth Prospects and Share of Irish Goods  
  Exports 
 
 Forecast % 
GDP Growth 
(Avg. Y-Y) 
Goods Exports 
(% of Total) 
Goods Exports 
(€bn) 
 
High Growth (>4%) 
2012 - 2017  2007 2011 2007 2011 
Hong Kong SAR 4.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 
Saudi Arabia 4.5  0.6  0.5 
Malaysia 4.9 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 
China 8.6 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.6 
 Total (High Growth) 5.5 (avg.)  3.8  3.5 
        
Moderate Growth (2% - 4%)     
Norway 2.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 
United Kingdom 2.3 18.6 15.6 16.6 14.5 
Canada 2.3 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 
Sweden 2.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 
Czech Republic 2.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 
United States 2.9 17.7 23.1 15.8 21.4 
United Arab Emirates 3.2  0.3  0.3 
Romania 3.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 
Australia 3.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Poland 3.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Mexico 3.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Israel 3.5  0.5  0.5 
South Africa 3.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Singapore 3.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 
Turkey 3.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Brazil 3.9 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
South Korea 3.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 
Russia 3.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5 
 Total (Moderate Growth) 3.2 (avg.)  47.2  43.9 
        
Low Growth (<2%)       
Eurozone 1.2 41.3 38.9 36.8 36.1 
Japan 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 
Denmark 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Switzerland 1.7 3.6 4.0 3.2 3.7 
Finland 1.8 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 
 Total (Low Growth) 1.5 (avg.) 47.9 45.6 42.8 42.4 
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Measuring Fiscal Stance 2009-2012 
 
Ide Kearney1 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the period since mid-2008 the Irish government has introduced a series of 
austerity measures equivalent to approximately 15 per cent of GDP. These 
measures were taken to try and reverse the deterioration in the government 
deficit that began in 2008. It is never a straightforward exercise to assess the 
outcome of such a package of discrete policy changes on the public finances. It is 
made more difficult in circumstances where the economy is going through a 
precipitous collapse in output and employment as occurred in Ireland between 
2008 and 2011. This collapse caused a dramatic decline in taxation revenues and 
an increase in unemployment-related expenditures, both of which serve to 
worsen the public finance position. In such circumstances, it is important to 
disentangle the effect of policy decisions (e.g. higher tax rates or lower transfer 
payments) which affect the discretionary fiscal position from those changes 
which are driven by the collapse in the economy.  
 
To address this issue we look at the fiscal stance adopted in individual budgets 
over the period 2008-2012 in this paper. The fiscal stance indicator we use is an 
attempt to isolate for each year discretionary changes in the budget balance from 
the total budget balance. In effect it looks at the difference between the actual 
budget outcome and the outcome that would have arisen assuming no change in 
policy, an “indexed” budget.  
 
We estimate an indexed budget using a set of detailed indexation rules which are 
included in the ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model. Using these rules, we 
simulate the HERMES model in successive years to estimate the budget balance 
that would have pertained in the absence of any discretionary budgetary changes 
in that year. The difference between the actual budget balance and this indexed 
budget is a measure of fiscal stance.  
 
We examine budgetary outcomes for each of the years since the onset of the 
fiscal and banking crisis in Ireland in 2008. Over the years 2009-2012 our results 
suggest that the cumulative effect of discretionary fiscal policy has been to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  I would like to thank Adele Bergin, David Duffy, Joe Durkan, John FitzGerald, Petra Gerlach, Diarmaid Smyth, two 
anonymous referees and participants at an internal ESRI seminar for comments on an earlier draft of this article. I 
would further like to thank Patrick Quill of the Department of Finance for advice on collating the 2011 and 2012 
budgetary data. 
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reduce the deficit by 5½ percentage points of GDP. Our results suggest that the 
impact of the very large package of measures introduced in 2009 was very 
modest. This was partly due to the very rapid deflation that occurred in 2009, our 
estimates suggest that this deflation served to  more than offset the nominal 
current expenditure cuts that were introduced in that budget. In 2010 and 2011 
the impact of fiscal policy has been much more marked, knocking between 1 ½ 
and 2 percentage points of GDP off the deficit in each year. We estimate that the 
effects of the 2012 Budget could also reduce the deficit by 1 ¾ percentage points 
of GDP. 
 
Looking further back to the last major crisis in the public finances in the 1980s, 
the estimates we present here suggest that the effect of the current fiscal 
consolidation for the years 2009-2012 has been much deeper than the fiscal 
consolidation in the period 1982-1986. In both periods, austerity measures were 
introduced against a backdrop of low or negative growth and rapidly rising 
unemployment.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the public finance 
position. In Section 3 we outline the methodology used to estimate the fiscal 
stance using the ESRI HERMES macroeconomic model. In Section 4 we present 
our estimates of the fiscal stance for each of the years 2008-2012. Section 5 
discusses the results. 
 
2. The Actual Budget Balance 2008-2012 
The Irish economy went into freefall in 2008, with output, income and prices 
collapsing. By 2011 GDP in current prices had fallen 16 per cent from its 2007 
peak, while GNP in current prices had fallen by almost one-quarter. The deep 
recession affected both output levels and prices. This caused a massive erosion of 
the tax base with a consequent collapse in government revenue. The heavy 
reliance on property-related taxes in the years preceding the collapse further 
exacerbated this, and exposed the narrowness of the tax base. Furthermore, the 
crisis led to a 15 per cent fall in the level of employment, which in addition to 
eroding the tax base, added to unemployment-related expenditures (transfer 
payments). 
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FIGURE 1  The Collapse in GDP, GNP and Employment 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
The government accounts were broadly in balance in 2007. However this masked 
the deep structural weakness in the underlying fiscal position that was revealed 
once the housing and banking crisis began. The gap between revenue and 
expenditure widened to a peak of almost €18.5 billion2 in 2009 with the 
underlying deficit as a share of GDP reaching almost 12 per cent (Figure 2). It 
narrowed slightly to €17 billion in 2010, however, given that GDP was also falling, 
its share of GDP barely changed. In 2011 the deficit fell to €14 billion or 9 per cent 
of GDP, and it is projected to narrow to €13 billion in 2012.   
 
FIGURE 2  General Government Deficit Net of Transfers to Banks 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Excluding transfers to the banks.  
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Figure 3 shows the path of government expenditure and revenue since 2005.3 It 
was in the years preceding 2007 that the property bubble and credit bubble were 
allowed to inflate (Bergin et al. 2011), with government revenues booming. In 
2008 both bubbles burst and the public finance and bank funding crises emerged.   
Figure 1 shows the speed with which general government revenue collapsed from 
2007 onwards, with total government revenue one-quarter or €16 billion lower in 
2010 compared to 2007. By the end of 2012, after five years of fiscal 
consolidation, total tax revenue is forecast to be €13 billion lower than in 2007. It 
is this collapse in tax revenues, and in particular property-related taxes, which is 
the proximate cause of the public finance crisis in Ireland.  
 
FIGURE 3  General Government Expenditure and Revenue, €billion 
 
 
 
 
On the expenditure side, total government expenditure continued to increase in 
2008 despite the crisis in revenues, rising by over €7 billion. From 2008 onwards 
total expenditure, excluding the cumulative €41 billion in monies transferred to 
the banks,4 has been falling and is projected to return to 2007 levels by 2012. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3  In this note we use detailed data for general government revenue and expenditure from the National Income and 
Expenditure 2011, Tables 19-25. For 2012 we use numbers supplied by the Department of Finance which are based on 
the Stability Programme Update, Department of Finance April 2012. This provides the most recent estimates for the 
official forecasts/targets for 2012 (2012 figures have an asterix to indicate forecast). See Appendix 2 for details. 
4  By the end of 2011 the government had made direct transfers of almost €63 billion to the banking sector. This 
consisted of €34.7 billion provided to Anglo Irish Bank and INBS (IBRC) by way of promissory notes issued by the 
exchequer. A further €28 billion was provided by the NPRF and the exchequer consisting of €20.8 billion to AIB and 
EBS, €4.7 billion to Bank of Ireland and €2.7billion to ILP. At the time of writing, €5.8 billion of these bank 
recapitalisation monies are being treated as a capital transfer in the national accounts, and are included in the 2011 
general government expenditure figures in Figure 2. The €31billion promissory note payment to IBRC in 2010 and the 
€4 billion exchequer payment in 2009 were already included in the general government expenditure figures in the 
national accounts in both these years. The total figure for capital transfers to the banks which is included in general 
government expenditure is thus €41 billion.  
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However the composition of total expenditure has changed significantly over that 
period, shifting from expenditure on goods and services (including capital 
expenditure) to transfer payments (see Table 1). Expenditure on current goods 
and services and capital expenditure are projected to have fallen by €8.8 billion 
between 2007 and 2012, while transfer payments are forecast to have increased 
by €9.0 billion, €4.5 billion related to personal transfer payments (unemployment 
benefit, pensions, other social welfare payments) and €4.5 billion of which relates 
to an increase in national debt interest payments to service the explosion in 
government debt.5 
 
TABLE 1 Government Revenue and Expenditure 2007-2012 
 
Change 2007-2012 €bn 
Taxes on income and wealth -3.0 Expenditure:  -9.0 
Taxes on expenditure  -6.8 Capital Expenditure -6.4  
Taxes on capital   -2.4 Current goods and services   -2.4  
Other receipts -1.0 Subsidies  -0.2  
   Transfer payments:  9.0 
   National debt interest 4.5  
   Other 4.5  
Total government receipts -13.2 Total expenditure  0.0 
General Government Balance -13.0 % of 2012 GDP  8% 
 
 
3. Methodology 
The actual budget balance reflects both cyclical developments and discretionary 
budgetary decisions. Fluctuations in economic activity significantly affect budget 
receipts and expenditure. During expansions tax receipts increase while some 
expenditures, such as unemployment benefits, decline and the reverse occurs in 
recessions. The movements in these budgetary categories are referred to as 
“automatic stabilisers” that operate to offset the effects of the economic cycle 
and lead to counter-cyclical movements in aggregate demand in the absence of 
any discretionary changes by the fiscal authorities.  
 
However, the collapse in the economy that occurred between 2008 and 2011 is 
far from a “cyclical” event or a fluctuation in economic activity. The bursting of 
the housing and credit bubbles, and the collapse in economic activity, prices and 
employment, exposed a structural weakness in the public finances which swiftly 
led to double digit deficit ratios. Within the maelstrom of this collapse in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  See FitzGerald and Kearney (2011) for details. 
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public finances, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of policy on the widening 
deficit.  
 
The fiscal stance indicator is an attempt to capture in a single indicator the 
combined macroeconomic effects of all the various decisions taken in a budget in 
respect of public expenditure and taxation. The macroeconomic impact of a 
government’s budget is typically judged on whether the fiscal stance is 
considered to be expansionary or contractionary in terms of either boosting or 
dampening aggregate demand in the domestic economy.   
 
3.1 The HERMES Measure of Fiscal Stance 
Our method of estimating fiscal stance is to use a macroeconomic model (the 
ESRI-HERMES model) to simulate the effects of an indexed budget, where 
indexation is based on assuming no policy change relative to the previous year’s 
budget. The difference between the indexed budget balance and the actual 
budget balance is then a measure of fiscal stance. A positive (negative) difference 
indicates a loosening (tightening) of fiscal policy. This is based on an incremental 
approach and so can be cumulated over time. Using a macroeconomic model for 
estimation allows for the implementation of detailed indexation rules for 
different items of revenue and expenditure.  
 
Effectively, the indexed budget is intended to simulate a “what if there were no 
policy changes” budget relative to the previous year. In practice average tax rates 
and average expenditure rates are held unchanged relative to the previous year, 
where detailed indexation rules are used for individual tax and expenditure 
items. Appendices 3 and 4 give details on the indexation rules employed.  We 
then compare this “indexed” outcome with the actual outturn in each year. The 
difference between the indexed and actual outcome provides an estimate of the 
fiscal stance.  
 
The full indexed budget is computed assuming no change in average tax and 
expenditure rates from the previous year, and applying the actual growth rate to 
the revenue and expenditure base. The use of average tax and expenditure rates 
ensures full indexation of the tax and welfare system. There is one exception to 
these indexation rules. Indexation of non-cyclical expenditure assumes it grows at 
its “long-run” growth rate which we implement as a nine-year average growth 
rate. This is intended to capture a measure of indexation that is neutral with 
respect to the cycle. 
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The derivation of an indexed budget using the HERMES macroeconomic model 
can be illustrated in a simplified example as follows. Define T as total revenue, 
GTR as cyclical expenditure (transfers) and GO as non-cyclical expenditure, then 
the actual budget balance B in year t is: 
tt GOGTR −−= tt T    B  
 
Define t as the average tax rate (T/Y), rtr as the average rate of cyclical 
expenditure (GC/Y), rgo as the average rate of non-cyclical expenditure (GO/Y). 
Then the budget balance can be expressed as a function of average tax and 
expenditure rates, which are discretionary policy instruments, times the base Y, 
where the base is determined by the rate of economic growth: 
ttttt YrgoYrtrY −−= tt   t  B  
 
Now define zt as the actual growth rate of Y in year t and z* as the “long-run” 
growth rate in non-cyclical expenditure. The budget balance indexed on the 
previous year’s budget is then:  
tttttttt zYrgozYrtrzY
*
111111-tt ...  t  B
~
−−−−− −−=  
where zt . Yt-1 =Yt.  With some manipulation this can be derived as: 
tttt Yz
zrgorgortr .).(t -   B-B~
*
1ttt 





−−∆−∆= −
 
 
From the formula we can see that increases in average tax rates will tighten fiscal 
stance while increases in average transfer rates will loosen fiscal stance. The last 
term implies that if non-cyclical expenditure grows faster than its long-run 
growth rate, this will loosen fiscal stance.6  
 
3.1.1 Tax Indexation Rules 
The main tax revenues are determined as the product of a tax “rate” by a “tax 
base”:  
ititit BASE .   t  T =  
 
For the purposes of indexation, there are detailed separate revenue categories 
identified. These include expenditure taxes (VAT receipts, customs taxes, excise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6  This can be seen by rewriting this third term as follows: 
t
tt
tt Y
zGG
z
zrgorgo '.'. 11 −−
−
=−  
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taxes, agricultural levies, motor vehicle duties, etc.) and income taxes (personal 
income taxes, social security contributions, corporate income taxes, DIRT taxes, 
agricultural income taxes, etc.). Appendix 3 and 4 give the detailed indexation 
rules applied for each category of revenue. Typically indexation to the previous 
year’s budget is implemented by setting the tax rate equal to that of the previous 
year, as follows: 
it1-itit BASE .   t  T
~
=  
 
There are some exceptions to this rule built in to the model to ensure accurate 
indexation. For example, the rate of excise duty is indexed to the deflator of 
private consumption because excise duties are levied on volumes.  
 
3.1.2 Expenditure Indexation Rules 
The indexation of expenditure items is more complicated because not all items of 
expenditure are cyclical. For cyclical items the indexation rules used can be 
summarised as follows: 
Unemployment transfers, GTRU, are modelled as the product of an 
unemployment transfer “rate” ru, applied to the “base” of total numbers 
unemployed, U: 
ttt  U. ru    GTRU =  
 
Because numbers employed is a volume base, the rate must be indexed to the 
appropriate price. In the HERMES model indexation of the rate of transfer 
payments uses a weighted average of the private consumption deflator and the 
average wage rate as the price term:  
ittt1-tt  U. )W)-(1P.(ru    
~~~~
 αα +=URTG  
 
Indexation of other personal transfers applies a similar price adjustment. In 
addition, because these transfers are mainly to the elderly (pensions) and the 
young (children’s allowance) there is a volume adjustment based on the growth 
in the dependency rate (the proportion of the population over 65 and under 14 
years of age).  
 
Indexation of subsidy payments imposes a growth rate equal to the growth in the 
relevant subsidy base. For example, agricultural subsidies are assumed to grow at 
the same rate as agricultural output. 
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For non-cyclical expenditure items, we assume no volume growth as a pure 
indexation rule. Indexed values of four categories of public investment, two 
categories of employment and public consumption were all computed on this 
basis.7 In normal times such an indexation rule would be deflationary8, however 
given the collapse in the economy, this no growth rule could in itself be regarded 
as having an expansionary bias in the years 2009 and 2010. To the extent that this 
is the case, our estimate of the fiscal stance in those years will in effect overstate 
the contractionary effect of fiscal policy. On balance we considered that a long-
run no-growth indexation rule was the best approximation for a realistic no policy 
change stance over the period in question. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Official Austerity Package 2008-2012 
In July 2008 the authorities began a policy of corrective action (see Appendix 2 
for details) to help control the burgeoning deficit. Official estimates suggest that 
€24 billion in discretionary budgetary measures have been implemented since 
mid-2008. This is equivalent to 15 per cent of 2011 GDP or 19 per cent of 2011 
GNP. These are nominal amounts which state the ex ante policy position, that is 
to say that they do not take account of the negative effects on employment, 
output and prices which reductions in expenditure and increases in taxation have 
on economic activity.  
 
TABLE 2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Estimates of Austerity, €billion 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
2009-
2012 
Estimated Ex Ante Measures Announced since mid-July 2008, €bn. 
Revenue 0.0 -5.6 0.0 -1.4 -1.6 -8.6 
Expenditure -1.0 -3.9 -4.3 -3.9 -2.2 -14.3 
of which capital: 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -1.9 -0.8 -4.2 
Total -1.0 -9.4 -4.3 -5.3 -3.8 -22.9 
% of GDP -0.6% -5.9% -2.7% -3.4% -2.4%  
Estimated Ex Post Effects of budgetary policy, €bn. 
Revenue 0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.9 -2.7 
Expenditure 2.0 -0.3 -2.4 -1.5 -2.0 -6.2 
of which capital: 0.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.3 -0.8 -3.7 
Total 2.4 -0.6 -3.0 -2.3 -2.9 -8.8 
% of GDP 1.3% -0.4% -1.9% -1.5% -1.8%  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  These are investment in public administration, health and education, local authority housing and roads, water supply 
and sewerage; employment in public administration, and health and education; and government's purchases of 
goods and services. See Appendix 3 and 4 for details. 
8 In Kearney et al. (2000) and Barrett et al. (2009) we used a long-run volume growth rate, estimated using a nine-
period centred moving average as an indexation rule. 
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Our estimates of the fiscal stance suggest that the cumulative effect of the fiscal 
consolidation package 2009-2012 (excluding 2008 because it only partially covers 
the fiscal consolidation period) is estimated to be €8.8 billion for a package of €23 
billion, just over one-third.9 This is on the low side, typically we would expect the 
ex post outturn to be roughly half the original ex ante measure. This anomaly can 
be traced to the 2009 Budget which had a rather perverse outcome. Our results 
suggest that in 2009 ex ante current expenditure measures of €3.6 billion 
introduced in the budget had an ex post stimulatory effect equivalent to €1 
billion. This highlights the difficulty of introducing austerity measures at a time of 
significant deflation.  
 
4.2 Individual Year Estimates of the Fiscal Stance 2008-2012 
Figure 4 shows the overall measure of fiscal stance based on the difference 
between an indexed and actual budget balance (GGB). A positive result implies an 
expansionary budget, a negative sign indicates a contractionary budget. 
 
FIGURE 4 Estimate of Fiscal Stance 
 
 
 
The results are interesting and instructive. At a first glance they suggest that it 
was not until 2010 that fiscal policy measures adopted began to have a significant 
impact on the deficit.  
 
2008: We estimate a strongly stimulatory budgetary stance of 1.3 per cent of 
GDP. This is not a surprising result. The policy of fiscal consolidation began in July 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9  In comparing with the ex ante position we compare full-year effects. Indexation assumes policy changes are 
implemented as a full year effect, including all carryover effects. 
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Fiscal Stance % of GDP
+VE = stimulatory, -VE = contractionary
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 2 |  7 7  
 
2008 when the government introduced a package of cuts equivalent to €1 billion 
on a full-year basis. However, this was only a small part of the overall budgetary 
measures introduced in 2008, all of which are captured in the HERMES indexed 
budget.  
 
2009: We estimate a mildly contractionary budgetary stance of -0.4 per cent of 
GDP. This is at first glance a very surprising result; given that the announced 
package of cuts is estimated to have been equivalent to almost 6 per cent of GDP. 
However, this occurred in the year when the economy was in freefall, and prices 
of consumer and investment goods both fell sharply. It points to the difficulties of 
implementing austerity cuts in a period of deflation.10 This means that a policy of 
no change in nominal expenditure levels, which in “normal” times would imply a 
discretionary tightening of policy, in 2009 would on average have led to a real 
increase in expenditure.  Our estimate of the fiscal stance for 2009 suggests that 
current expenditure had a stimulatory effect on the economy equivalent to 0.6 
per cent of GDP (Figure 4). 
 
2010: We estimate a highly contractionary budgetary stance of 1.9 per cent of 
GDP. This is lower than the announced package of €4.3 billion (2.7 per cent of 
GDP) however, allowing for the negative effects of austerity on growth and 
employment, and against a backdrop of continued deflation, this estimate looks 
consistent with the ex ante numbers. 
 
2011: We estimate a strongly contractionary budgetary stance of 1.5 per cent of 
GDP. Again this is lower than the ex ante package of €5.3 billion or 3.4 per cent of 
GDP.  
 
2012: We estimate a contractionary budgetary stance of 1.8 per cent of GDP. 
These figures are based on the latest official forecasts of the general government 
deficit from the Stability Programme Update, April 2012.  
 
Figure 5 breaks down the composition of the fiscal stance measure among the 
main categories of expenditure. Scanning across the graph it is clear that changes 
in current expenditure have been the most discretionary element of recent 
budgetary policy. What is most noticeable is had current expenditure been fully 
indexed in 2009, the fiscal stance would have been significantly more 
contractionary than the actual outcome.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10  For example during 2009 consumer prices as measured by the private consumption deflator fell by 7 per cent. 
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FIGURE 5 Composition of Fiscal Stance 
 
 
 
4.3 Comparison with Other Measures of Fiscal Stance 
The standard approach is to estimate a cyclically adjusted or “structural” budget 
balance. This is referred to as the “gaps and elasticities” approach that involves 
estimating an output gap measure and then using this along with elasticity 
measures to adjust budgetary items. This measure is defined as what the budget 
balance would be were the economy operating at capacity, where capacity is 
typically defined as full employment output or trend output. Many international 
institutions, including the OECD, the European Commission and the IMF produce 
estimates of cyclically adjusted budget balances based on this definition. 
 
Even in normal times there are a number of difficulties in interpreting the 
structural budget balance as an indicator of fiscal stance. First, there are 
methodological difficulties surrounding the definition and measurement of 
capacity output to generate the gap measure and the underlying elasticities in 
the measures favoured by the international agencies. These difficulties are 
significantly exacerbated following the sort of collapse in the economy that 
Ireland has just witnessed. Second, the structural budget balance (SBB) measures 
the total effects of discretionary policy, which is a cumulative measure, and does 
not measure the impact of the current year’s budget relative to the previous 
year’s budget. Because of these difficulties many institutions now use the change 
in the SBB as a measure of fiscal stance, which is an incremental measure. If the 
SBB increases (decreases) in a given year, this would imply a tightening 
(loosening) of fiscal policy in that year’s budget. To arrive at an estimate of the 
total stance of discretionary fiscal policy over a number of years, these changes 
can be aggregated over time.  
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Figure 6 shows the estimated fiscal stance from HERMES together with estimates 
of changes in the structural budget balance (SBB) from the Department of 
Finance budget book, which are based on European Commission estimates, and 
the September 2012 IMF estimates. The Budget Book estimate shown here is the 
change in the cyclically adjusted budget balance or the structural budget balance 
published in successive budget book publications.11  
 
The differences in individual years are striking. In 2009 all three measures agree 
that the very large package of measures introduced in that year had virtually no 
effect on the deficit. Similarly, all three measures are close in their assessment of 
the 2011 Budget, with the IMF estimating a reduction in the structural balance of 
2.3 per cent of GDP compared to a Budget Book estimate of 1.7 and a HERMES 
estimate of 1.5. However, the results diverge sharply for 2010 and 2012. For 2010 
the HERMES estimate suggests that the budgetary stance was strongly 
contractionary at 1.9 per cent of GDP. The IMF estimate for 2010 is significantly 
lower at 1.2 per cent of GDP but it still estimates a strong contractionary fiscal 
stance. By contrast the Budget Book estimate suggests that the 2010 Budget had 
no effect on the structural deficit.  
 
FIGURE 6 Comparison with Official and IMF Estimates 2008-2012 
 
 
 
 
A similar divergence emerges for 2012 with the HERMES and IMF estimates much 
closer than the European Commission figures. The Budget Book estimate of the 
change in the SBB for 2012 is estimated at just 0.4 per cent of GDP. This is very 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11  In each case we take the most recently published estimate of the SBB. The 2008 and 2009 estimates are from Budget 
2009, the 2010 estimate is from Budget 2010, the 2011 estimate from Budget 2011. The 2012 estimate is taken from 
Table A5 of the SPU, April 2012. 
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different to that estimated by the IMF which implies a change of 1.5 percentage 
points in the structural balance, much closer to the HERMES 1.8 estimate of fiscal 
stance.12  
 
4.4 Fiscal Policy is Predominantly Pro-cyclical 
Figure 7 shows our estimate of the fiscal stance from 1976 to 2012 cumulated 
over successive periods13 of expansionary or contractionary budgetary stance. 
The graph also shows the average annual growth rate in those periods. At first 
glance it is clear that fiscal policy has been broadly pro-cyclical throughout the 
last three and a half decades, with the exception of the years 1987-1989 when 
the government introduced a successful fiscal consolidation during a period of 
positive growth.  
 
The period 1977-1981 shows a cumulative expansionary effect, reflecting the 
strong expansion in current expenditure in that period. Following this, the 
budgets of the early and mid-1980s show up as mildly contractionary coupled 
with growth rates averaging just 0.7 per cent per annum. This was followed in the 
1987-1989 period by a period of very sharp fiscal adjustment which occurred at a 
time of a strong recovery in growth in the Irish economy.  
 
FIGURE 7 Fiscal Stance (LHS) and GDP Growth Rate (RHS), Annual Averages  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12  The Department of Finance have regularly expressed concerns that estimating the SBB using the EU common 
methodology is problematic for open economies such as Ireland. In the most recent 2012 Budget they again urged 
caution in interpreting the SBB figures. 
13  These periods are chosen to correspond to distinct periods of fiscal policy stance. See Barrett et al. (2009) for details. 
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During the 1990s, as growth began to take off, the average fiscal stance was 
mildly expansionary, accelerating in the period 1999-2002 which shows a 
significant expansionary fiscal stance. There was some fiscal retrenchment in 
2003-2004 following the dot-com recession before strong expansion in the years 
2005-2007. What is interesting about the 2005-2007 period is the similarity in the 
growth rate and the magnitude of the fiscal stance to the earlier 1977-1981 
period of expansion. By contrast, the subsequent fiscal consolidation of 2008-
2012 has been deeper than that estimated in the period 1982-1986 when very 
little progress was made ex post in discretionary budgetary adjustments.  In both 
cases, the austerity measures were introduced against a backdrop of low or 
negative growth and rapidly rising unemployment. The fiscal consolidation in the 
1980s was only successfully completed in the latter part of the decade during a 
re-emergence of strong growth in external demand which helped to offset the 
very sharp fiscal contraction of the years 1987-1989. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we present estimates of the fiscal stance based on an analysis of the 
fiscal consolidation budget packages introduced over the period 2008-2012. Our 
results suggest that the ex post effects of austerity were initially quite modest. In 
particular we find that the 2009 Budget was broadly neutral despite a very large 
package of cuts. In the years 2010 through to 2012, we estimate that fiscal policy 
has had a significant effect on the deficit, with a cumulative reduction in the 
structural deficit of over 5 ½ percentage points. 
 
While fiscal stance measures can be used to assess the likely expansionary or 
contractionary impact of budgetary policy on economic activity, they are silent on 
the appropriate stance of budgetary policy. Given the crisis that the Irish 
government faced in 2009 and 2010 with the precipitous collapse in its budget 
balance, the yawning pit of mounting bank losses all funded by the general 
government purse, and the sovereign’s eventual inability to independently raise 
funding on financial markets, there was little choice but to commence an 
aggressive fiscal consolidation programme to bring the public finances under 
control. This austerity programme, pursued over the past five years, which served 
initially to stabilise and more recently to reduce the deficit on the public finances, 
has occurred against a backdrop of a very deep recession in terms of output, 
employment and incomes. As in the 1980s, the Irish authorities find themselves 
once again in a position where they are pursuing an aggressive austerity 
programme against the tide, with a deeply pro-cyclical fiscal stance.  
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APPENDIX 1 The General Government Balance 2006-2012 
 
€million  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current receipts         
Taxes on income and wealth 19,945 20,904 19,231 16,651 16,143 18,642 19,925 
Social Insurance contribution 8,159 9,053 9,259 8,924 8,701 7,532 7,000 
Taxes on expenditure 24,666 25,216 22,246 18,271 17,922 17,678 18,375 
 Gross trading income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gross rental income  536 568 676 495 535 524 475 
Investment income 1,239 1,615 2,172 1,979 2,167 2,044 2,400 
Transfers from ROW*  210 55 149 97 113 52 200 
Miscellaneous receipts  2,906 2,933 3,058 3,418 4,180 3,991 3,400 
        
Total receipts - current  57,661 60,345 56,792 49,835 49,759 50,464 51,775 
        
Capital receipts         
Taxes on capital   3,442 3,488 1,767 801 582 1,123 1,113 
Transfers from ROW 193 162 76 175 48 132 150 
Other receipts 1,930 2,369 1,766 628 200 171 108 
Total receipts - capital 5,566 6,019 3,609 1,604 831 1,426 1,371 
Total receipts  63,227 66,364 60,400 51,438 50,590 51,890 53,146 
        
Current expenditure         
 Subsidies  775 870 939 893 879 639 625 
National debt interest 1,828 1,957 2,376 3,246 4,937 5,143 6,450 
Transfer payments  20,390 23,180 26,214 28,317 27,859 28,319 27,671 
Goods and services:    26,813 29,530 31,167 30,273 28,026 27,111 27,149 
Wages,salaries and pensions           18,106 19,838 21,136 20,468 19,050 18,854 19,174 
 Other                                8,707 9,692 10,030 9,805 8,976 8,257 7,975 
Total current expenditure  49,806 55,537 60,695 62,729 61,701 61,213 61,896 
Capital expenditure         
 Grants to enterprises 593 823 2,046 4,844 32,160 6,060 725 
Recapitalisation of Financial 
Institutions    4,000 31,575 5,777   
 Other transfer payments  701 1,016 985 241 -375 364 550 
Gross physical capital formation      6,810 8,788 9,769 6,069 5,512 4,249 2,937 
 Payments to the rest of the world        105 35 31 18 27 27 50 
Total capital expenditure 8,209 10,662 12,830 11,173 37,325 10,701 4,262 
Total expenditure    58,014 66,198 73,525 73,901 99,025 71,913 66,158 
        
Net lending / net borrowing  5,212 166 -13,125 -22,463 -48,435 -20,023 -13,012 
General Government Balance 5,193 170 -13,129 -22,467 -48,426 -20,158 -13,012 
 
Source:  National Income and Expenditure 2011 Table 21 for 2006-2011. Stability Programme Update (SPU) April 2012 background tables 
for 2012 as supplied by Department of Finance. The data for 2012 are directly comparable with Table 21 in the National Accounts 
and are slightly different to the published data in Table A1 in the SPU. 
*ROW= Rest of World.  
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APPENDIX 2 Ex Ante Discretionary Measures 2008-2012 
 
Year Measure Source €bn 
2008 Expenditure July 2008 €1.0 
2009 Revenue Budget 2009 (Oct 2008) €2.0 
 Expenditure February 09 €2.1 
 - Tax revenue Supplementary Budget 2009 (Apr 2009) €3.5 
 - Current Expenditure Supplementary Budget 2009: Apr 2009 €1.2 
 - Capital Expenditure Supplementary Budget 2009: Apr 2009 €0.6 
2010 - Current Expenditure Budget 2010: Dec 2009 €3.3 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2010: Dec 2009 €1.0 
2011 - Current Expenditure Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €2.1 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €1.9 
 Tax revenue Budget 2011: Dec 2010 €1.4 
2012 - Current Expenditure Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €1.5 
 - Capital Expenditure Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €0.8 
 Tax revenue Budget 2012: Dec 2011 €1.6 
2008-
2012 
TOTAL  €23.9  
 
Source: For 2008-2010 Report of the Review Group on State Assets and Liabilities. [Table 2.1: Budgetary Adjustments since mid-2008 – 
 Planned Budgetary Impact.] For 2011 and 2012 Budget 2011, Budget 2012, Medium Term Fiscal Statement, November 2012 
 Table 2.1. The figures included show the full year effects, including carryover, and exclude once-off measures. 
 
 
 APPENDIX 3 Indexation Rules in Government Accounts in HERMES 
 
Item Indexation Rule 
REVENUE  
EXPENDITURE TAXES:  
  Excise Tax Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  VAT Previous year’s average tax rate 
 Carbon Taxes Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Stamp Duties, Fees, etc. Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  Motor Vehicle Duties-Companies Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to personal consumption deflator 
  Customs Duties Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Rates Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
  Agricultural Levies Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in agricultural output prices 
  Contribution to EC Budget (-) Previous year’s contribution indexed to growth in OECD GDP 
TAXES ON INCOME:  
  Personal Income Tax Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Social Insurance Contributions Previous year’s average rate for both employee and employer 
  Company Taxes: Corporation Tax Previous year’s average tax rate 
  Motor Vehicle Duties-Personal Previous year’s average tax rate, indexed to Personal consumption deflator 
  Farmers' Income Tax Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in agricultural incomes 
  DIRT Previous year’s tax take indexed to growth in average deposit interest from GNP 
NON-TAX INCOME  
   Trading & Investment Income Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
   Transfers From Abroad Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
   Other Taxes Previous year’s level indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
CAPITAL REVENUE Previous year’s level indexed to growth in GDP deflator 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE  
PUBLIC CONSUMPTION  
  Wage bill - Public Admin. Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
  Wage bill - Other Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
  Non-Pay Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in wages 
Subsidies  
 
 APPENDIX 3  Indexation Rules in Government Accounts in HERMES (Continued) 
 
Item Indexation Rule 
  Consumer Split in two: transport subsidies indexed to growth in output in transport and communications sector,  
other consumer subsidies indexed to growth in nominal consumption. 
  Other Subsidies  
      Agricultural Growth in gross output in agricultural sector 
      Non-agricultural subsidies Growth in nominal GDP at factor cost 
PERSONAL TRANSFERS  
  Unemployment Average rate indexed to either wages or prices (normally wages but in this paper prices) 
  Pensions etc. Previous year indexed to change in dependent population (under 14 and over 65) and  
growth in either wages or prices (in practice wages) 
Debt Interest  
Transfers to Rest of World Contribution to EU budget indexed to growth in OECD GDP;  
other government transfers indexed to growth in nominal GNP 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE  
INVESTMENT  
  Housing Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Public Admin. Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Health & Education Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
  Other Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator 
CAPITAL TRANSFERS  
  to Industry Unchanged rate 
  to Households Unchanged rate 
Other Capital expenditure Long-run volume growth rate* times actual change in price deflator (GDP deflator) 
 
*  The long-run volume growth rate in “normal times” is calculated as a nine-year centred moving average growth rate. This is intended to capture a measure of non-cyclical growth in each individual expenditure item, 
smoothing out cyclical changes.  
  
 
 
APPENDIX 4  Detailed HERMES Code Used for this Paper 
 
 Mnemonic Base Rate and Indexation Rule 
General Government Balance GBR=GTTOT+GR-GC-GK 
Total Current Revenue GTTOT  GTTOT=GTE+GTY+GTTI+GTTABR+GTW  
   Excise Tax GTEXT Personal Consumption volume (C), Tourism Exports volume (XTO) and 
the personal consumption deflator (PC) 
 Rate Indexed to PC 
   VAT GTEVAT C, PC, Private Housing  Investment (IHPV), Tourism Exports (XTOV) and 
Government Consumption of Goods and Services Non-Pay (GCGNPV) 
Rate Unchanged 
   Carbon Taxes GTECA Carbon Emissions (CO2)  Rate Unchanged 
   Stamp Duties, Fees, etc. GTEO C, PC, and Building Investment (IBV) Rate Indexed to PC 
   Motor Vehicle Duties-Companies GTEMVDC  Stock of Cars (SCARS) Indexed to PC 
   Customs Duties GTECUSO  Imports of Goods and Services (MGSV) Rate Unchanged 
   Rates GTERATE GNP in current prices (GNPV)  Indexed to GNPV 
   Agricultural Levies GTAGLEV Indexed to PQGA (Price deflator of Gross Agricultural Output) 
   Contribution to EC Budget (-) EECTG GNP Price deflator and OECD GDP (PGNP*GDP_OECD) Indexed to PGNP*GDP_OECD 
Total Taxes on Expenditure GTE GTE=GTEXT +GTEVAT + GTECA+GTEO+GTEMVDC+GTECUSO+GTERATE+GTAGLEV -EECTG 
   Personal Income Tax GTYPER Personal Disposable Income (YRPERT)  Rate Unchanged 
   Social Insurance Contributions GTYSL Wage Income (YWI + YWSM)  Rate Unchanged 
   Corporation Tax GTYC  Non-Wage Income (YC)  Rate Unchanged 
   Motor Vehicle Duties-Personal GTYMVDP  Stock of Cars (SCARS) Indexed to PC 
   Farmers' Income Tax GTYA Agricutlural Income (YAG)  Indexed to YAG 
   DIRT GTYDIRT  Indexed to RD*GNPV (RD=deposit interest rate) 
Total Taxes on Income GTY GTY=GTYPER+GTYSL+GTYC+GTYMVDP+GTYA+GTYDIRT 
Trading & Investment Income GTTI  Indexed to GNPV 
Transfers From Abroad GTTABR  Indexed to GNPV 
Other Taxes GTW  Indexed to GNPV 
Capital Revenue GR Indexed to GDP price deflator (PGDP)  
Current Expenditure: GC  GC=GCGV+SUB-EECS+GCTPER+GCTNT+GCTABR 
Public Consumption GCGV  GCGV=OSNPV+GCGOWV+GCGNPV  
  Wages - Public Admin. OSNPV Value added (OSNPV) equals wage bill (YWSNP)  
Wage bill (YWSNP) = Employment (LSNP) times Wage (WSNP)P 
 Index WSNP to average wages WNA; LSNP unchanged 
 
  
 APPENDIX 4  Detailed HERMES Code Used for this Paper (Continued)  
 Mnemonic Base Rate and Indexation Rule 
  Wages – Other GCGOWV GCGOWV=YWSNHE  
    Wages – Health and Education YWSNHE YWSNHE=LSNHE*WSNHE Index WSNHE to average wages WNA; LSNHE unchanged 
  Non-Pay GCGNPV Index to PGCGNP (price deflator) 
Subsidies GCS GCS=GCSC+GCSO  
  Consumer Subsidies GCSC GCSC=GCSCO+GCSCT  
     Transport GCSCT OSMTCV (Value added in Transport and Communications) Index to OSMTCV 
     Other    GCSCO Index to Personal Consumption (CV) 
  Other Subsidies GCSO GCSO=GCSA+GCSONA   
       Agricultural GCSA GCSA=GCSANS+GCSAS  
Sales GCSAS Gross Output in Agriculture (QGAV)  Index to QGAV 
Non-Sales GCSANS Gross Output in Agriculture (QGAV) Index to QGAV 
       Other Non-agricultural subsidies GCSONA GDP at factor cost in current prices (GDPFCV) Index to GDPFCV 
Personal Transfers GCTPER GCTPER=GCTU+GCTREST   
  Unemployment GCTU Unemployment (U)  Index to weighted average of WNA and PC1 
  Pensions etc. GCTREST Index population aged under 14 and over 65 to weighted average of WNA and PC 
Debt Interest GCTNT    
Transfers to Rest of World GCTABR GCTABR=GCTAEO+GCTAO  
   Non-tax contribution to EU budget GCTAEO GCTAEO = EECBUD-EECTG  
   Contribution to EU budget EECBUD PGNP*GDP_OECD Indexed to PGNP*GDP_OECD 
   Other govt transfers abroad GCTAO Indexed to GNPV 
Capital Expenditure GK GK=IHGV+ISNPV+ISNHEV+ISMGV+GKTI+GKTH+GKREST 
  Housing IHGV Index to PIH 
  Public Admin. ISNPV Index to PISNP 
  Health & Education ISNHEV Index to PISNHE 
  Other ISMGV Index to PISMG 
  Capital Transfers to Industry GKTI Total Industrial Investment (IIV)  Rate Unchanged 
  Capital Transfers to Households GKTH Private Housing Investment (IHPV)  Rate Unchanged 
Other Capital expenditure GKREST No Indexation, this is assumed unchanged 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  In the HERMES model there is an option to index unemployment transfer payments and other transfer payments (GCTREST) to either wages or prices or a weighted average of both. The default option is full 
 indexation to wages. 
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What Do We Know About Special 
Educational Needs? Evidence from Growing 
Up in Ireland 
 
Joanne Banks and Selina McCoy∗ 
 
Despite the recent policy emphasis on educational inclusion little is known about 
children with special educational needs in Ireland. The Education for Persons with 
Special Educational Needs (2004) Act highlighted a commitment to inclusive 
education and in particular to increasing the number of students with special 
educational needs attending mainstream schools. While significant changes have 
taken place, crucial information has been lacking – including the numbers of 
children with special educational needs (SEN), their profile and how they fare in 
school. Based on Growing Up in Ireland data on nine year old children, this 
bulletin draws together three journal papers and a research report1 to provide 
valuable insights into special educational needs in Irish primary schools. This 
research provides much needed evidence for policy decisions by focusing on the 
scale and prevalence of SEN, the characteristics of students identified with SEN 
and the social and academic experiences of these students in school. 
 
Prevalence 
The term special educational needs can mean different things, depending on the 
context. The definition has changed considerably over time and as a consequence 
so too has our understanding of which students are likely to have such needs. 
Increasingly, the policy trend is to broaden the definition of SEN and create more 
inclusive education systems, but wide variations in prevalence estimates persist 
across countries. In Ireland, the EPSEN Act (2004) introduced a broader definition 
of SEN than heretofore, which includes a broad range of difficulties ranging from 
physical disabilities to learning disabilities and emotional-behavioural difficulties. 
For the first time, information collected about 8,578 nine-year-old children in the 
Growing Up in Ireland survey has provided a unique opportunity to combine data 
from two sets of key informants (parents and teachers) to identify the cohort 
experiencing SEN. Overall one-in-four children were found to have some form of 
SEN – a rate consistent with recent studies internationally – with boys showing 
higher levels than girls. 
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Identifying Students with SEN 
Analysing the Growing Up in Ireland data allows us to move beyond measuring the 
scale of special educational needs in Ireland and explore the composition of 
children with SEN as identified by their teachers and whether SEN levels vary 
across different social groups. This new research shows that children from 
working class backgrounds are far more likely to be identified with SEN. This is 
particularly the case for working class boys who display high levels of SEN (of a 
non-normative type such as emotional/behavioural difficulties – EBD). Moreover, 
children attending schools designated as socio-economically disadvantaged are 
significantly more likely than their peers to be identified as having EBD. We 
further examined whether EBD as identified by teachers, or within certain schools, 
is matched by the child’s own performance on an internationally validated 
emotional and mental health self-concept measure. When we take account of 
children’s performance on this self-concept measure, we find that certain groups 
of children are disproportionately likely to be identified with EBD. This includes 
boys, children from economically inactive households and children attending 
designated disadvantaged schools.  
 
School Experiences for Students with SEN 
These issues in SEN identification highlight the importance of understanding the 
everyday school experiences for this group of students: in essence, how do they 
get on in school? Importantly, school experiences and overall attitudes towards 
school vary among children with SEN according to the type of disability or need 
they have. It is clear that children with SEN, particularly those identified with 
learning disabilities, face considerable barriers to fully engage in school life. In line 
with previous research on boys in school more generally, findings show that boys 
with SEN are more likely than girls with SEN to dislike school. Moreover, children 
with SEN from semi- and unskilled social class backgrounds are also more likely to 
be disengaged from school. For students with such additional needs, low levels of 
academic engagement and poor relations with their peers and teachers play a 
central role in explaining their low levels of school engagement and overall 
enjoyment of school.  
 
Policy Implications 
These research findings highlight the need for discussion by policymakers and 
practitioners around the definition of SEN as per the EPSEN Act. In reaching a new 
prevalence estimate of 25 per cent this is an opportune time to have a meaningful 
debate around our understanding of special education and our commitment to 
inclusion in our schools. These findings raise questions around the processes of 
SEN identification in schools and, in particular, whether being identified with a 
SEN is influenced by the social background characteristics of the child or the social 
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mix of students in the school. From a policy perspective the over-representation 
of boys, children from disadvantaged backgrounds and children attending 
disadvantaged schools within the SEN group, highlights the need to review the 
ways in which children with SEN, and in particular children with EBD, are 
identified. This research highlights the practical implications of placing children 
with SEN in mainstream schools. By simultaneously examining the role of 
academic and social relations in shaping the engagement of children with SEN, the 
analysis provides a unique opportunity to fundamentally assess the barriers to 
true inclusion for children with special needs. 
 
1 Banks, J. and S. McCoy, 2011. A Study on the Prevalence of Special Educational Needs, 
Trim: National Council for Special Education.  
Banks, J., M. Shevlin and S. McCoy, 2012. “Disproportionality in special education: 
identifying children with emotional behavioural difficulties in Irish primary schools”, 
European Journal of Special Needs Education, Vol. 27, No.2, pp. 219-235.  
McCoy, S. and J. Banks, 2012. “Simply academic? Why children with special educational 
needs don’t like school”, European Journal of Special Needs Education, Vol. 27, No. 
1, pp. 81-97. 
McCoy, S., J. Banks and M. Shevlin, 2012. School matters: how context influences the 
identification of different types of special educational needs, Irish Educational 
Studies, Vol.31, No.2, pp. 119-138. 
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